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I.

INTRODUCTION

The extraordinary success of the economy's digital sector is indisputable.
Microsoft, Apple, Amazon, Alphabet (Google), and Facebook are the top five
companies traded on the U.S. stock market. Not coincidently, all five
companies are digital "platforms" to one degree or another.1 With this level
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1.
The term "platforms" (a.k.a. "multi-sided" or "two-sided markets") describes a
business model that utilizes a system or network where more than one group (e.g., users,
merchants, or advertisers) participates in order to engage in a mutually beneficial exchange.
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of market success, growth, and influence-both economically and
culturally-it is perhaps inevitable that a litany of concerns have been raised
about these platforms and their conduct. 2 Concerns range from privacy
violations to political influence, the promulgation of fake news, and the
downfall of investigative journalism.3 Most relevant for this Article is the
claim that these firms have been engaging in anticompetitive conduct, or are
otherwise insulated from competitive forces, and that this has remained
unchecked despite antitrust laws. 4
Recently, these concerns have transitioned into calls for more aggressive
antitrust enforcement-primarily through changes in predicates and
presumptions-and, increasingly, direct government regulation to address the
market power and associated misconduct of leading digital platforms.5 These
calls are coming from both sides of the political divide. In Congress, Senate
Democrat Amy Klobuchar introduced a bill that would ban significant
acquisitions by any company with a market capitalization over $100 billion
unless the acquirer could demonstrate that the transaction would not lessen
competition by more than a de minimis amount. 6 Senate Republican Josh
While there is no canonical definition, Professors Andrei Hagiu and Julian Wright offer a good
starting point: Platforms "enable direct interactions between two or more distinct [groups]"
where each group "is affiliated with the platform" in some manner typically through
"platform-specific investments." Andrei Hagiu & Julian Wright, Multi-Sided Platforms,
43 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 162, 163 (2015). Regardless of their precise definition, platforms are
principally characterized by cross-group effects, or indirect network effects. Id. These are effects
that occur when the size of one group on the platform creates a positive externality on one or
more of the other groups, which, in turn, attracts them to the platform. See id at 164. Some
platforms also have direct network effects, which occur when the increase in the size of a given
group confers additional benefits to other members of the same group (e.g., telephone systems,
fax machines, e-mail, and social media). See id at 163.
2.
While Microsoft is no stranger to antitrust scrutiny and is one of the largest American
companies in terms of market capitalization, Microsoft appears, at the moment, to be largely
immune from the current debate regarding platforms and antitrust. The consensus is either that
Microsoft is not engaging in antitrust violations or that it has an insufficient amount of market
power in the areas of commerce that are attracting the most attention, such as social media,
online search, and mobile services.
3.
See Maureen K. Ohlhausen & Alexander P. Okuliar, Competition, Consumer
Protection, and the Right [Approach]to Privacy, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 121, 132 (2015); Maurice
E. Stucke, HereAre All the Reasons It's a BadIdea to Let a Few Tech CompaniesMonopolize

Our Data, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar. 27, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/03/here-are-all-the-reasonsits-a-bad-idea-to -let-a-few-tech-companies-monopolize-our-data [https://perma.cc/4UXJ-NX4
N].
4.
Stucke, supra note 3.
5.
See, e.g., Brent Kendall & John D. McKinnon, Congress, Enforcement Agencies
Target Tech

House Panel to Probe Industry over Concerns About Competition as Oversight

Intensifies, WALL ST. J. (June 3, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ftc-to-examine-howfacebook-s-practices-affect-digital-competition-11559576731 [https://perma.cc/VZ8Z-5R72].
6.
Consolidation Prevention and Competition Promotion Act of 2017, S. 1812, 115th
Cong. §§ 2(b), 3 (2017).
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Hawley cosponsored a bill that would require large platforms to conform to
regulations governing the portability of data generated on the platform as well
as the interoperability of the platform.7 And Senate Democrat Elizabeth
Warren has proposed breaking up big technology companies and regulating
them as public utilities. 8

State attorneys general have formed a nationwide coalition to investigate
the "troubling concerns for businesses and consumers" due to Google's
practices. 9 The two federal antitrust agencies, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), are both actively investigating
most of the large technology companies. 10
The justification and intellectual foundation for this reform movement is
coming from two broad sources. First, a group of academics have called for a
7.
Augmenting Compatibility and Competition by Enabling Service Switching Act of
2019, S. 2658, 116th Cong. §§ 3(a), 4(a) (2019).
8.
See Elizabeth Warren, How We Can Break Up Big Tech, MEDIUM (Mar. 8, 2019),
https://medium.com/@teamwarren/heres-how-we-can-break-up-big-tech-9ad9e0da324c [https:
//perma.cc/HFE6-2JF7]. More recently, Senator Warren has drafted the Anti-Monopoly and
Competition Restoration Act, which would, among other things, change the burden of proof;
amend the Clayton Act to ban "mega-mergers"; and add more conduct to a prohibited list of
conduct. See Eric Newcomer & Joshua Brustein, Warren Is Drafting US. Legislation to Reverse
Mega Mergers,' BLOOMBERG (Dec. 4, 2019, 6:43 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/art
icles/2019-12-04/warren-is-drafting-u-s-legislation-to-reverse-mega-mergers [https://perma.cc/
SP8L-K59S]. Relatedly, there have been proposals to regulate the algorithms that platforms use,
such as the Filter Bubble Transparency Act. See, e.g., Press Release, John Thune, U.S. Sen. for
S.D., Thune, Colleagues Introduce Bipartisan Bill to Increase Internet Platform Transparency
and Provide Consumers with Greater Control Over Digital Content (Nov. 1, 2019),

https://www.thune.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2019/1 /thune-colleagues-introduce-bipartisan
-bill-to-increase-internet-platform-transparency-and-provide-consumers-with-greater-control-o
ver-digital-content [https://perma.cc/GJ24-5BBX].
9.
Brent Kendall, Attorneys General Launch Probe of Google, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 9,
2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/attomeys-general-launch-probe-of-google-11568055853
[https://perma.cc/T2SM-3W6U]. State attorneys general have the ability to bring both federal
and state antitrust actions. The authority to bring a federal action, either as a direct purchaser of
products or as parens patriae for persons residing in their state, was part of the Hart-ScottRodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976. Milton A. Marquis et al., State Attorney General
AntitrustEnforcement: Trends andInsights, CPI ANTITRUST CIRON., Aug. 2019, at 2, 2. Most
states also have their own state antitrust statutes. For example, Iowa's antitrust statute, "An Act
for the Punishments of Pools, Trusts and Conspiracies," Act of Apr. 16, 1888, ch. 84, 1888 Iowa
Acts 124, was passed on April 16, 1888, and predates the Sherman Act.
10. Complaint, United States et al. v. Google, LLC, 1:20-CV-03010 (D.D.C. Oct 20,
2020) [hereinafter Google Complaint]; Complaint for Injunctive & Other Equitable Relief,
Federal Trade Commission v. Facebook, Inc. (D.D.C. Dec. 9, 2020); Ryan Tracy, FTC Says
Several Tech Antitrust Probes Are
Under Way, WALL
ST.
J.
(Nov.
18,
2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ftc-says-multiple-antitrust-probes-are-under-way11574100990 [https://perma.cc/NKJ5-MX6K]; Brent Kendall, Justice Department to Open
Broad, Antitrust Review of Big Tech Companies, WALL ST. J. (July 23, 2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-department-to-open-broad-new-antitrust-review-of-bigtech-companies-11563914235 [https://perma.cc/7442-NH42].
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rejection or severe reduction of the Chicago School's influence on antitrust. 1
This "neo-antitrust" academic movement has been percolating for some time.
Yet the movement earnestly emerged with Lina Khan's argument that modern
antitrust doctrine, particularly in relation to platform markets, is incapable of
properly constraining market power.1 2

Second, recent reports commissioned by foreign competition agencies
and domestic institutes have addressed whether antitrust jurisprudence and
practice can constrain "dominant" digital platforms. 13 Specifically, in the past
year, there have been reports commissioned by the United Kingdom's
Chancellor of the Exchequer and Secretary of State for Business, Energy, and
Industrial Strategy (Furman Report);" the European Commission's (EC)

11. See Lina M. Khan, The End ofAntitrust History Revisited, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1655,
1656 n.7 (2020) (citing academics calling for a reduction in the Chicago School's influence).
Some have called for a rejection of the consumer welfare standard, which is the current lodestar
of federal antitrust laws and is implemented through various forms of legal rules. See Reiter v.
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) ("Congress designed the Sherman Act as a 'consumer
welfare prescription."'). For a critique of the movement arguing for the replacement of the
consumer welfare standard, see Joshua D. Wright et al., Requiem for a Paradox: The Dubious
Rise andInevitable Fall ofHipsterAntitrust, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 293, 295, 362-68. (2019).
12. Lina M. Khan, Note, Amazon 's Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 717 (2017)
(arguing "that gauging real competition in the twenty-first century marketplace especially in
the case of online platforms requires analyzing the underlying structure and dynamics of
markets").
13. While the term "dominance" has no real legal meaning in the United States, it is
increasingly being used to refer to a firm that has "monopoly power." Monopoly power does not
have precise metes and bounds. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S.
451, 481 (1992) ("Monopoly powerunder § 2 requires, of course, something greaterthan market
power under § 1."). A general rule of thumb is that a firm with market shares above 50% in a
well-defined relevant product and geographic market has monopoly power. Monopolization
Defined, FED. TRADE COMM'N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide[https://perma.cc/R2G8-EJL6].
antitrust-laws/single-firm-conduct/monopolization-defined
However, courts have properly bifurcated market shares from strict findings of "monopoly"
power. See W. Parcel Express v. UPS, 190 F.3d 974, 975 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that although
a firm owns a dominate share in the market, it does not possess market power unless there are
significant barriers to enter that market); see also Harrison Aire, Inc. v. Aerostar Int'l, Inc., 423
F.3d 374, 381 (3d Cir. 2005). The term "dominance" has been largely imported from the
European Commission, where it is principally associated with Article 102 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union. In assessing whether a firm is dominant, the European
Commission examines a number of factors, including market share where, "[i]f a company has
a market share of less than 40%, it is unlikely to be dominant." Competition, Antitrust
Proceduresin Abuse of Dominance, EUR. COMM'N (July 2013), https://ec.europa.eu/competitio
n/publications/factsheets/antitrust_procedures_102_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/NK2B-BWSZ].
14.

DIGIT. COMPETITION EXPERT PANEL, UNLOCKING DIGITAL COMPETITION (2019)

[hereinafter FURMANREPORT] https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/govemment/uploads/sys
tem/uploads/attachmentdata/file/785547/unlockingdigital competitionfurman_reviewweb
.pdf [https://perma.cc/KK6Z-ZF36]. The chair of the U.K. report is Professor Jason Furman,
who was also the chair of President Obama's Council of Economic Advisors.
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Directorate-General for Competition (Crdmer Report); 15 and the Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC Report).16 Additionally,
there have been reports from domestic institutes, such as the Stigler Center at
the University of Chicago (Stigler Report). 17
The predominant theme that emerges from these reform movements is
that digital platforms are increasingly becoming "winner-take-all" or "winnertakes-most" markets in important areas of commerce: Google in online search,
Facebook in social media, and Amazon in online shopping. 18 Critics assert
that platforms have insulated themselves from competition through barriers to
entry arising from network effects, big data, and economies of scale and
scope. 19 The emerging presumption is that the resulting market power enables

these platforms to behave in ways that are harmful to consumers, and existing
antitrust laws are ill-equipped to prevent these harms.20
Yet what is generally missing amid the calls to either change antitrust
presumptions or seek legislative solutions is a full consideration of the
potential benefits of the specific practices in question. Relatedly, there is little
self-examination in considering whether the proposed changes could give rise
to problems of their own, potentially making the "cure" worse than the
"disease."
Consider, for example, the seemingly widespread condemnation of firms
for preferencing their own content-such as when Google uses Google Maps

in local search queries or when Amazon prominently ranks its private label
15.

JACQUES CRtMER ET AL., EUR. COMM'N, COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE DIGITAL

ERA (2019) [hereinafter CR1MER REPORT], https://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/report
s/kd0419345enn.pdf [https://perma.cc/X2TV-ES3K].
16.

AUSTL. COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMM'N, DIGITAL PLATFORMS INQUIRY

(2019) [hereinafter ACCC REPORT], https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Digital%20platform
s%20inquiry%20-%20final%20report.pdf [https://perma.cc/KF8Y-3AQG].
17.

STIGLER COMM. ON DIGIT. PLATFORMS, FINAL REPORT (2019) [hereinafter STIGLER

REPORT], https://research.chicagobooth.edu/-/media/research/stigler/pdfs/digital-platforms---c
ommittee-report---stigler-center.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NL4-ELZA].
18. FURMAN REPORT, supra note 14, at 4 ("In many cases, digital markets are subject to
'tipping' in which a winner will take most of the market."); STIGLER REPORT, supra note 17, at
8 ("[Digital platform] markets are prone to tipping; that is, they reach a point where the market
will naturally tend towards a single, very dominant player .... "); see also Jonathan Tepper,
Opinion, Competitionis Dying, andTaking Capitalismwith It, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 3, 2018, 3:00
PM), https://www.bloonmberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-11-25/the-myth-of-capitalism-expose
d [https://perma.cc/ERX5-T7FZ] ("Laws are outdated to deal with the extreme winner-takes-all
dynamics online.").
19.
20.

See FURMAN REPORT, supra note 14, at 2.
STIGLER REPORT, supra note 17, at 57; see also FURMAN REPORT, supra note 14, at

2 ("[C]ompetition policy will need to be updated to address the novel challenges posed by the
digital

economy."); OECD,

GOING DIGITAL

IN A MULTILATERAL WORLD 7

(2018),

https://www.oecd.org/going-digital/C-MIN-2018-6-EN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N3AR-HVKL]
("[C]ompetition frameworks designed for traditional products may not be suitable for a global
digital economy.").
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products in search results.21 Similarly, platforms are being condemned for
preinstalling proprietary defaults and applications on mobile devices (e.g.,
Google Play on Android phones and Safari on Apple devices). 22 The
implication is that large tech firms that either preference their own products
or default to their own products harm consumers through anticompetitive
conduct. 23 Yet there is scant evidence that these particular behaviors and

policies are actually creating widespread inefficiencies and harms to
consumers, which must be present to change the presumption regarding these
common practices. 24 Rather, the focus has largely been on the impact on
competitors and the lack of equal treatment of rivals.2 5
Thus, instead of calling for careful consideration of specific claims for a
given market, recommendations have already moved to the policy proposal
level. 26 These proposals can be broadly categorized as either (1) bolstering
current antitrust laws to make them more favorable to plaintiffs, primarily
through changes in predicates and presumptions, or (2) imposing new

regulations that would ostensibly increase the level of competition in these
markets, regardless of whether the firm in question can be shown to have
engaged in anticompetitive conduct under existing antitrust laws. 27 This

Article addresses the first category of reforms-namely, whether some of the
proposed presumptions, as applied to large digital platforms, are based on
sound economics and justify altering current antitrust doctrines. 28
21.
22.

See, e.g., STIGLER REPORT, supra note 17, at 8.

26.

See STIGLER REPORT, supra note 17, at 22.

See Id
23. Id. ("Consumer harm is greatest when market power is combined with behavioral
biases: Consumers tend to stick with default options.").
24. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass'nv. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 781 (1999) ("The object is to see
whether the experience of the market has been so clear, or necessarily will be, that a confident
conclusion about the principal tendency of a restriction will follow from a quick (or at least
quicker) look, in place of a more sedulous one.").
25. This approach has been rejected by the courts: "The antitrust laws . . were enacted
for 'the protection of competition, not competitors."' Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,
Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320
(1962)).
27. See FURMAN REPORT, supra note 14, at 5.
28. If bolstering current antitrust laws lacks strong justification, then, a fortiori,
implementing more interventionist regulatory solutions to address perceived shortcomings in
antitrust enforcement lacks strong justification. There are clearly other justifications for
regulation that are not related to antitrust enforcement per se. For the costs and considerations
associated with regulation from a law and economics perspective, see generally THOMAS A.
LAMBERT, HOW TO REGULATE: A GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS (2017). Also, it is not exactly

clear how the various regulatory proposals for digital platforms would fit together with current
antitrust laws; however, antitrust has a long history of coexisting with other industry regulation.
For a discussion of the relative benefits and costs of using antitrust law to achieve policy
objectives, as opposed to industry regulation, see Dennis W. Carlton & Randal C. Picker,

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol72/iss2/4
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These recommendations are not being made in a vacuum. Recently, critics
have argued that the DOJ and FTC are tolerating too many false negatives and
allowing anticompetitive mergers to go through. 29 Research also shows that
broad measures of industry concentration-though
not market
concentration-are increasing. 30 Additionally, critics point out that thus far,
there has not been a major U.S. antitrust decision against digital platforms. 31
Even if agencies and courts accept these studies and criticisms at face value,
they offer little guidance for specific antitrust claims.
To date, there has been no systematic response to the key presumptions
driving the conclusions in influential digital reports. This Article examines
each of the key premises underlying the analyses and proposals of critics who
contend existing antitrust laws and policies are inadequate and need to be
dramatically changed or updated through stronger or new presumptions. In

particular, this Article examines how the nature and scope of network effects
differ between online search and social media platforms. It also questions
whether the use of data to improve the quality of a product is a form of
Antitrust and Regulation, in ECONOMIC REGULATION AND ITS REFORM: WHAT HAVE WE

LEARNED? 25 (Nancy L. Rose ed., 2014).
29. For the most celebrated study on merger enforcement, see JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS,
MERGER CONTROL, AND REMEDIES: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF U.S. POLICY 158 (2014).
See also JONATHAN BAKER, THE ANTITRUST PARADIGM: RESTORING A COMPETITIVE

ECONOMY 15 (2019). More broadly, the error-cost framework is a type of decision-theory
approach that weighs alternative legal solutions based on the relative frequency and associated
costs of false positives and false negatives along with administrative costs. See, e.g., Frank H.
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 3 (1984); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Analysis ofLegal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 267-69 (1974).
30.

Eg., COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, ISSUE BRIEF: BENEFITS OF COMPETITION AND

INDICATORS OF MARKET POWER 4 (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default
/files/page/files/20160414_ceacompetitionissuebrief.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2A4P-M6JW];
Gustavo Grullon et al., Are US Industries Becoming More Concentrated?, 23 REV. FIN. 697,

&

698 (2019); Jan De Loecker et al., The Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic
Implications, 135 Q.J. ECON. 561, 563 (2020). Importantly, Professors Luke Froeb and Gregory
Werden explain why increases in concentration in such broad aggregates need not bear any
relationship to increases in concentration in relevant antitrust markets. Gregory J. Werden
Luke M. Froeb, Don 'tPanic:A Guide to Claims ofIncreasingConcentration,ANTITRUST, Fall
2018, at 74, 74.
31. The Apple e-Books case is a notable exception, but that case was based on allegations
of collusion rather than on characteristics that differentiate digital markets per se. United States
v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 296 (2d Cir. 2015). In contrast, the EC has brought and won
numerous high-profile antitrust cases, including cases against Google Search and Google
Android in recent years. Importantly, these two decisions involved allegations of preferencing,
vertical integration, and setting defaults. See European Commission Press Release IP/17/1784,
Antitrust: Commission Fines Google (2.42 Billion for Abusing Dominance as Search Engine
by Giving Illegal Advantage to Own Comparison Shopping Service (June 27, 2017) [hereinafter
Commission Fines Google E2.42 Billion]; European Commission Press Release IP/18/4581,
Antitrust: Commission Fines Google (4.34 Billion for Illegal Practices Regarding Android
Mobile Devices to Strengthen Dominance of Google's Search Engine (July 17, 2018).
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network effect. What emerges from this assessment, along with a review of
some key research into network effects, is that network effects cannot simply
be assumed to be a market failure. Rather, they are more appropriately
assessed as a market feature that must be analyzed and understood for each
particular market. Further, this Article explicitly develops a framework and
model to assess platform defaults and guide reform discussion. It also
examines whether self-preferencing and vertical integration by platformsthrough private labeling-necessarily reduce consumer welfare. Finally, this
Article examines the leading antitrust case involving platforms-the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Ohio v. American Express Co., 32 which has been

heavily criticized and used as proof that courts simply cannot get digital
markets right.33 As will be explained, the Court's decision properly melded
the rule of reason approach with economic learning on multisided platforms.
What emerges is that agencies and courts are better served, first and
foremost, by attempting to understand how these economic characteristics
explain firm behavior, market outcomes, and consequences for consumers. 34
For instance, economic concepts, such as network effects, should not be used
in a perfunctory manner. Ultimately, there is an insufficient amount of

evidence to suggest the existence of a systematic market failure that warrants
a dramatic departure from current antitrust policies and practices. A greater
danger is that false base premises will lead to improper policy decisions and
generate harmful side effects that eventually harm the very people and
processes these changes aim to protect.35

This is not to suggest that the current market outcomes in regard to
Google, Facebook, and other digital platforms are perfectly efficient. Nor is it
to suggest there is not apossibilityof improving those outcomes by updating
priors and changing presumptions. Importantly, however, this Article
presumes that the current "norms" within antitrust law remain to allow firms

to "extract" surplus from consumers when the firm has obtained its market
power legitimately and on the merits-through "superior skill, foresight and
industry." 36 What is properly condemned by antitrust law is conduct that
extends that market power-either within the same market or into adjacent
32. 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).
33. See, e.g., STIGLER REPORT, supra note 17, at 91 ("[T]he Court is hostile to antitrust
enforcement (at least in vertical and exclusion cases), does not understand multi-sided markets
very well, and might be more influenced by ideological preconceptions than by evidence in the
case or fact-finding by district court judges.").
34. Professor Thibault Schrepel echoes this point. See Thibault Schrepel, Antitrust
Without Romance, 13 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 326, 327 (2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=33950
01 [https://perma.cc/XVC3-CZAN] ("[T]he effectiveness of antitrust authorities should be
enhanced by applying reason to antitrust law rather than fears, feelings, or sentiments.").
35. See id at 387-402 (defining the dangers of transforming current antitrust laws
according to "moralistic" policy).
36. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
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markets in a manner that is not based on the merits. This "extraction" versus
"extension" framework is a useful paradigmatic description of the current
antitrust regime. 37
II.

DIGITAL PLATFORMS AND NETWORK EFFECTS

Antitrust reform advocates and digital reports almost universally take as
their starting point an assertion that network effects lead platforms to "tip"
toward one firm, resulting in monopoly. 38 Further, there is the view that

"benefits, for an incumbent platform, of network externalities are due to the
difficulty for users to coordinate migration to a new platform" 39 (i.e., that
platform monopolists benefit from high barriers to entry due to switching
costs). Ultimately, this leads to the conclusion that "dominant digital firms
have strong incentives to engage in anti-competitive behaviour." 40 This part

assesses that foundational base premise.
A.

Network Effects and the "Winner-Takes-All" Presumption

In discussing network effects, Professors Michael Katz and Carl Shapiro
state: "There are many products for which the utility that a user derives from
consumption of the good increases with the number of other agents consuming
the good." 4 1 Canonical examples of products with network effects are
telephones and fax machines. As more individuals and companies adopt these
products, the benefits to all users (the "network" of users) increases. 42 This
creates a positive feedback loop where having more users makes the network
more valuable and desirable to each additional user. 43 Such effects are akin to
"demand-side economies of scale" (i.e., the benefits of consumption increase
as the network expands). 44
A particular concern of the early economic literature on network effects
was that markets with strong network effects could become "stuck" on a given
37. Dennis W. Carlton & Ken Heyer, Extraction vs. Extension: The Basis for
Formulating Antitrust Policy Towards Single-Firm Conduct, COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L,
Autumn 2008, at 285, 285. It is worth noting that Professor Einer Elhauge has been critical of
this paradigm based in part on its failure to incorporate wasteful ex ante costs to obtain these
profits. See Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly
Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 401 (2009).
38.

STIGLER REPORT, supra note 17, at 39; FURMAN REPORT, supra note 14, at 57.

39. CRtMER REPORT, supra note 15, at 22.
40. Id. at 3.
41. Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition,
Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424 (1985).
42. See id
43. See id
44. See STIGLER REPORT, supra note 17, at 37-38.
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standard or product. 45 The idea is that even if a better, superior product (or
standard) were to emerge, customers may stick with the large and inferior
network they are currently on because there is a coordination problem that
inhibits migration. 46 An individual customer might view the competing

product (or standard) as being technologically superior, but switching can be
harmful to that consumer unless others shift at around the same time. After
all, who wants to be the only customer on the world's best and most advanced
communication system that no one else uses? Unless users can somehow
organize a universal (or very large) collective "switch"-something that is
presumed to be exceedingly costly and unlikely-the incumbent network
remains dominant. 47 Entry difficulties are further exacerbated when there are
increasing returns to scale on the production side as well. 48 The concern, then,
is that dislodging a first mover becomes extremely difficult.
Certainly, with positive feedback effects, there is a greater tendency for
markets to "standardize" on a given product or platform compared to a market
where network effects are nonexistent or weak. 49 The strength of this tendency
will depend, however, on a number of factors that will be further explored in
the context of online search and social network platforms in the following
sections.

First and most obviously, it will depend on the strength of the network
effect and whether the network effect is primarily responsible for the success
of a product.50 Second, "[c]onsumer heterogeneity and product differentiation
tend to limit tipping and sustain multiple networks." 51 There are numerous

examples of competing platforms coexisting, including console video game
systems (PlayStation, Xbox, Nintendo), mobile operating systems (Android,
Apple), desktop operating systems (Windows, MacOS, Linux), web browsers
(Chrome, Safari, Edge, Brave), travel search engines (Expedia, Tripadvisor,
45. For pioneering work on potential market inefficiencies from network effects, see
generally Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation, 16
RAND J. ECON. 70 (1985); W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, IncreasingReturns, and
Lock-In by HistoricalEvents, 99 ECON. J. 116 (1989).
46. See Farrell & Saloner, supra note 45, at 82; Arthur, supra note 45, at 116, 127 ("But
in the increasing returns case laissez-faire gives no guarantee that the 'superior' technology (in
the long-run sense) will be the one that survives.").
47. See Farrell & Saloner, supra note 45, at 71 (explaining that "excess inertia" can
impede the collective switch from an incumbent form of technology to a newer, perhaps superior
version).
48. See Arthur, supra note 45, at 128 ("[I]ncreasing returns can cause the economy
gradually to lock itself in to an outcome not necessarily superior to alternatives, not easily
altered, and not entirely predictable in advance.").
49. Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition andNetw ork Effects, J. ECON.
PERSPS., Spring 1994, at 93, 105-06.
50. See id
51. Katz & Shapiro, supra note 49, at 106; see also Marc Rysman, The Economics of
Two-Sided Markets, J. ECON. PERSPS., Summer 2009, at 125, 134.
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Kayak, Skyscanner), and ride sharing applications (Uber, Lyft, Juno). 52 Third,
"tipping is less likely if agents can easily use multiple standards." 53 This could
be due to relatively low switching, consumption, or production costs from
using multiple products. Fourth and finally, the welfare implications of
markets tipping to a dominant system, platform, or product are not always

clear.5' The intuition is that there are strong efficiencies from compatibility
and interoperability, including from both demand-side and supply-side
economies of scale.55 The cost, however, results from losing variety and
potentially being locked into an inferior standard or product. Relatedly, the
economics literature has not settled the question regarding which type of
market structure leads to greater rates of innovation (e.g., competition versus
monopoly); 56 it is largely this question that will ultimately determine the
welfare consequences of markets where a dominant firm primarily emerges
from network effects.
Following the early theoretical work on network effects, Professors Stan
Liebowitz and Stephen Margolis challenged the conventional view of market
tipping and lock-in. 57 In a series of papers, they examined whether markets
with network effects have a propensity to remain with inferior standards when
faced with improved technologies. 58 The point was not to definitively prove
52. See Rysman, supra note 51, at 134 (explaining that fixed costs in the video game
industry has led to an "increased distribution across multiple game systems" and "a lessconcentrated game system market").
53. Id.
54. See Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardizationand Variety, 20 ECON. LETTERS
71, 73-74 (1985); Angelique Augereau et al., Coordination Versus Differentiation in a
Standards War: 56K Modems, 37 RAND J. ECON. 887, 907 (2006). In discussing the 56K
modem, one study observed that welfare would have been significantly improved if the various
internet service providers (ISPs) standardized on a single platform, rather than on multiple 56K
modem platforms. Id. at 888 ("[T]here was a benefit to coordinating ISPs and consumers on a
single standard as quickly as possible, but market actors failed to quickly standardize.").
55. A prime example of this is the continued importance of standard-setting organizations
(SSOs), which play a role in developing, supporting, and establishing interoperability and
performance standards for industries such as telecommunications, electronics, and the Internet.
Fundamentally, SSOs are platforms that balance the interests of multiple groups, including those
developing technologies and those looking to implement them. Joanna Tsai & Joshua D. Wright,
Standard Setting, Intellectual Property Rights, and the Role of Antitrust in Regulating
Incomplete Contracts, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 157, 159 (2015).
56.

See generally Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: Antitrust Fosters

Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 575, 577-86 (2007) (reviewing the economic literature on
market structure and innovation).
57. S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205 (1995) [hereinafter Path Dependence]; S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E.
Margolis, The Fable ofthe Keys, 33 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1990) [hereinafter Fable of the Keys].
58. Fable of the Keys, supra note 57, at 1 ("The economic literature on standards has
focused recently on the possibility of market failure with respect to the choice of a standard. In

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

11

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 4
[VOL. 72: 3051

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

316

that network effects always lead to the efficient outcome. 59 Rather, they
sought to challenge the presumption that network effects tend to lead to
inefficient outcomes based only on untested case studies that allegedly
demonstrated inefficiencies. 60 The authors first examined what was, at the
time, a widely accepted example of the so-called "inefficient path
dependency": where the standard QWERTY keyboard in use today managed
to prevail over an allegedly superior version-the Dvorak keyboard-because
the latter was unable to overcome first-mover advantages and network
effects. 61 After examining the history and economics of keyboards, they found

that the continued use of the QWERTY keyboard is actually efficient. 62
Liebowitz and Margolis also made an important distinction between
"network effects" and "network externalities." 63 While these terms are often
used synonymously today, their distinction is highly relevant to the current
antitrust debate concerning successful platforms and their alleged
inefficiencies. Specifically, a market can have "network effects" without
necessarily leading to market failure (i.e., "network externalities"). 64 In other
words, the mere presence of network effects says nothing about their
magnitude and whether they are principally responsible for a platform's
success-not to mention whether they hinder competitive entry and reduce
social welfare. The lesson from Liebowitz and Margolis's scholarship, along
with the larger literature on network efforts, is that concepts like network
effects and lock-in should not be assumed a priori to cause market failures and
its strongest form, the argument is essentially this: an established standard can persist over a
challenger, even where all users prefer a world dominated by the challenger, if users are unable
to coordinate their choices.").
59. See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon
Tragedy, J. ECON. PERSPS., Spring 1994, at 133, 147 [hereinafter Network Externality]
(concluding that the Dvorak studies were flawed and incomplete).
60. STAN J. LIEBOWITZ & STEPHEN E. MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS & MICROSOFT:
COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY 240 (2d

ed.

2001) ("[M]arket failure

ought to be a very specific and very worldly claim. Policymakers shouldn't go about correcting
markets until they have concrete proof that markets have failed. The abstract possibility of
market failure is an inadequate basis for the making of real-world policy.").
61. See Fable of the Keys, supra note 57, at 7-8.
62. Id. at 2. In another study, the authors examined the competition between video home
system (VHS) and Beta to become the standard for analog video recording, once again detailing
how the actual evidence diverges from the conventional perception. See PathDependence, supra
note 57, at 218-19. In this case, Beta was the superior video cassette format but lost out to VHS
due to the existence of indirect network effect advantages enjoyed by VHS. See id. The indirect
network effect arose from the availability of movies and shows on a specific video format
including the rental market, which increased the demand for the video player and vice versa. See
id at 208. The Beta and VHS scenario is particularly illustrative because VHS overcame Beta's
first mover advantage of about two years in the United States. See id at 221.
63.

Network Externality, supra note 59, at 135.

64. Id. ("The advantage of this definition over other possible definitions is that it
corresponds with the common understanding of externality as an instance of market failure.").
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should not be used in a mechanical and superficial manner-particularly as
they pertain to public policy. 65 Network effects certainly may lead to market
failures, and if so, there are important questions to consider-including what
the best solution is for that failure.
The following sections closely examine the nature of network effects for
both online search and social media platforms to determine what outcomes
network effects drive and to what extent they contribute to a platform's
success. Further, they assess whether these network effects create an
insurmountable barrier to entry that insulates inefficient monopolists from
competitive pressures-in essence, whether there is an argument that
systematic market failures are occurring and require a change in presumption

regarding the relationship between digital platforms, network effects, and
market power.
B.

Network Effects and Online Search Platforms

Online search engines like Google are multisided platforms that bring
together two distinct groups: users and advertisers. 66 If there are direct
network effects, the actual size of each group must directly affect the utility
that each particular member of the group receives from participating in the
activity. 67 These ideas can be formalized in the following manner.
Suppose the benefits that users derive from using a platform-that is, their
utility function-is a function of the number of other users on the platform:
Us. =

f(S), where

Us, is the utility of individual Si and S is the total number

of users. If there are direct network effects, then this would imply that as the
total number of users (S) increases, the utility that individual (S) derives from
the platform also increases: dUs./dS > 0.
For advertisers, the analogous idea is that their utility is a function of the
number of other advertisers: UA. = f(A), where UAL is the utility of advertiser
A1 and A is the total number of advertisers. Again, direct network effects
would imply that dUA./dA > 0.

65. See, e.g., Catherine Tucker, What Have We Learned in the Last Decade? Network
Effects and Market Power, 32 ANTITRUST, Spring 2018, at 77, 77 ("[N]etwork effects are not
the guarantor of market dominance that antitrust analysts had initially feared."); Daniel F.
Spulber, Unlocking Technology: Antitrust and Innovation, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 915,

918 (2008) ("Despite being rarely observed, technology lock-in remains influential in
competition policy.")
66. See John M. Yun, UnderstandingGoogle's Search Platform and the Implicationsfor
Antitrust Analyses, 14 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 311, 315 (2018).

67. See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 41, at 96; Nicholas Economides & Lawrence J. White,
Networks and Compatibility: Implicationsfor Antitrust, 38 EUR. ECON. REV. 651, 652 (1994)
("[T]he externality affects directly the utility function of each customer." (emphasis omitted)).
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For users searching for content online, however, having a larger network
of users does not directly increase the value that any particular user derives
from searching.68 There is no reason to expect a user to be anything other than
indifferent as to whether other users happen to be searching on the same
platform. 69 This is vastly different from a telephone, fax machine, or e-mailwhere directly adding users offers positive value to the existing set of users. 70
On the advertiser side, adding more advertisers does not directly increase the
value that a particular advertiser derives from the product.7 1 In fact, there is
likely a "crowding" effect, which is a negative direct network effect. 72 For
example, more advertisers for the query "iPhone case" will bid up the price to
advertise for that query. 73

Rather, two things drive participation on the Google platform: (1) the
quality and relevance of its content and (2) indirect network effects. 74
Regarding the former, the raison d'etre and primary "glue" that makes an

online search platform attractive is content-specifically, the quality and
relevance of search results. 75 Will users easily find what they are looking for?
As a result, from the users' perspective, the key utility they obtain from a
search platform is not a network effect at all.
Suppose that the dominant search engine does an outstanding job of
providing relevant search results to users-better than the closest alternatives.
In non-digital markets, this would be thought of as producing an especially
desirable product. 76 Antitrust has tended not to object to market outcomes so

68.
69.

The notion of "more users" can also mean more queries from the same set of users.
See Catherine Tucker, Online Advertising and Antitrust: Network Effects, Switching
Costs, and Data as an Essential Facility, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Apr. 2019, at 2, 2 ("Samesided network effects are unlikely to be that important in online advertising markets. Typically,
consumers of content do not benefit from the presence of other consumers of content."); Hal
Varian, Use andAbuse ofNetwork Effects, in TOWARDS A JUST SOCIETY: JOSEPH STIGLITZ AND
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ECONOMICS 227, 230 (Martin Guzman ed., 2018) ("[T]here are no
traditional network effects in search.").
70. Katz & Shapiro, supra note 41, at 424. Not surprisingly, direct network effects are
particularly strong in products intended to foster and facilitate communication with other
members in the network.
71. See Yun, supra note 66, at 321.
72. Id.
73. See id at 317.
74. See id at 315-21.
75. See Michael R. Baye et al., Search Engine Optimization: What Drives Organic Traffic
to Retail Sites?, 25 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 6, 6 (2016) ("The lion's share of retail traffic
through search engines originates from organic (natural) rather than sponsored (paid) links.").
76.

See, e.g., Kelly Custer, Designing DesirableProducts: It's Not Luck It's Strategy,

KNACK (July 17, 2019), https://www.knackdesignstudio.com/post/designing-desirableproducts-its-not-luck-its-strategy [https://perma.cc/GGB8-FV6D].
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generated (even if the result is high concentration)-and for good reason, as
this directly implicates dynamic incentive effects.77
From the perspective of advertisers, network effects play a critical role in
their participation, but it is through indirect network effects rather than direct
ones. 78 This idea can be represented in the following manner for advertisers:
UA. = f(S), where indirect network effects imply d UA./dS > 0. The idea is
that the utility of an advertiser (UA.) is positively affected by the number of
users (S).

Indirect network effects occur because more users increase an advertiser's
benefit of being on the platform (dUA/dS > 0), which, in turn, will attract
more advertisers. 79 Yet this effect is largely-although perhaps not
completely-a one-way street, given that having more advertisers is not likely
to materially affect the number of users: dUs./dA = 0.80 This is not to say
that having relevant advertisements provides no value to consumers. 81
Although it seems fair to assert that the presence of advertisements is not the
primary driver of consumer participation on search platforms. Indirect

network effects are at the heart of advertisers' participation, not only on
Google's search platform but also on all advertising-based platforms,
including Facebook, newspapers, and radio stations. 82

77. See, e.g., Spulber, supra note 65, at 966 ("Private sector experimentation is
particularly valuable in resolving uncertainties in discovering and developing new technologies.
Antitrust policy that targets successful innovators threatens to reduce such experimentation.").
78. See, e.g., Tucker, supra note 69, at 3.
79. See Des Traynor, Surviving and Thriving in Two-Sided Markets, INTERCOM (Aug.
14, 2012), https://www.intercom.com/blog/surviving-thriving-in-two-sided-markets [https://per

ma.cc/4HYJ-QZ86].
80. According to one source, the average click-through rate for search advertisements on
Google is 3.17%. Mark Irvine, Google Ads Benchmarks for YOUR Industry [Updated.!],
WORDSTREAM: WORDSTREAMBLOG, (July 17, 2020), https://www.wordstream.com/blog/ws/
2016/02/2 9/google-adwords-industry-benchmarks [https://perma.cc/6E66-54G7]. While this
can vary depending on the type of query, even the category with the highest click-through rate
Dating & Personals is at 6.05%. Id. Another source confirms this relatively low percentage:
on both Google and Bing the percentage of clicks that are advertisements is at 6%. Danny
Goodwin, Organic v. PaidSearch Results: Organic Wins 94% of the Time, SEARCH ENGINE
WATCH (Aug. 23, 2013), https://www.searchenginewatch.com/2012/08/23/organic-vs-paidsearch-results-organic-wins-94-of-time [https://perma.cc/9EQ3-NA8Y].
81. For a large-scale field experiment on a search engine to determine the impact of more
prominent advertisements on user engagement, see Navdeep S. Sahni & Charles Zhang,
Searching Advertising and Information Discovery: Are Consumers Averse to Sponsored

Messages? (Stan. Univ.

Graduate Sch. of Bus., Rsch. PaperNo. 3441786, 2019), https://ssm.co
m/abstract=3441786 [https://perma.cc/3AM7-7DNG]. The authors found no evidence that more
prominent advertisement placement reduces usage, and found, on average, the number of
searches increased 2.47% for the treatment group. Id at 4.
82. Note that the specific type of user may affect advertiser participation differentially.
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Given the above analysis, is it likely that online search markets will "tip"
to a monopoly outcome because of network effects?83 If so, all the work must
be done by the indirect network effect that drives advertiser participation
(dUA./dS > 0). On this point, because a larger user base induces more
advertisers to participate, certainly having it facilitates monetization and,

ultimately, the viability of a search platform. 84 Additionally, greater advertiser
participation increases both the likelihood that a relevant advertisement can
be shown for a given query and the revenues generated from a given
advertisement auction. The driving force behind a platform's success,
however, comes from attracting users, and users are attracted through
content.8 5 If a competing platform offers more compelling content, then it
would be expected to attract more users-and, with it, more advertisers and
advertising revenue. Thus, an entrant's ability to monetize is based neither on
breaking the advertisers' network effect nor on "coordinating" the advertisers
to switch to its platform; rather, it is based on increased user traffic from
quality content.86 There are no network effects for users, however. Thus, in
online search markets, incumbents have no inherent network effect advantage
because the indirect network effects are unidirectional.8 7 Consequently,
neither direct nor indirect network effects can serve as a barrier to entry, given
that neither contribute to the content that materially drives user traffic. 88
83. See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 51, 105-06.
84. Yun, supra note 66, at 321.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. If this holds, there are a number of potential, testable implications based on comparing
online search advertising margins with other digital and non-digital advertising margins
although an empirical study would need to carefully control for other factors that influence
margins, including advertising effectiveness based on the differential level and quality of the
intellectual property.
88. There is a larger question of what exactly constitutes a "barrier to entry" particularly
in the context of competition law. The tension in defining barriers to entry is that there are really
two ways in which the term is generally discussed. As Professor Dennis Carlton states, "Trying
to use 'barriers to entry' to refer to both the factors that influence the time it takes to reach a new
equilibrium and to whether there are excess long-run profits is confusing." Dennis W. Carlton,
Barriersto Entry, in 1 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 601, 606 (2008). It seems the
label "barriers to entry" is being increasingly used for considerations that disallow instantaneous
entry, such as the need to develop brand names and the existence of economies of scale and
informational advantages. Id. at 604. In the context of competition policy, I prefer C.C. von
Weizsacker's definition: "a barrier to entry is a cost of producing which must be bome by a firm
which seeks to enter an industry but is not borne by firms already in the industry and which
implies a distortion in the allocation of resourcesfrom the socialpoint of view." C.C. von
Weizsacker, A Welfare Analysis of Barriers to Entry, 11 BELL J. ECON. 399, 400 (1980)
(emphasis added). For example, if economies of scale can increase overall welfare and we
associate entry barriers with inefficiencies, then von Weizsacker asks, "in which sense can we
speak of a barrier to entry?" Id. at 401. Similarly, a barrier to entry in the context of digital
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Of course, the digital reports have not limited their assessment of digital
platforms to network effects. 89 There is also a recognition that economies of
scale and scope potentially play a key role in a platform's success. 90 While
the focus in this Article is on network effects, this presumption should also be
closely examined. 91 It very well might be true, but again, the question is the
magnitude of the effects and what level of output is required to take advantage
of economies of scale and scope. Additionally, scale economies may differ
depending on the specific platform.9 2 In any event, large scale economies are
something that antitrust law has traditionally had to deal with, and they are
not unique to the current digital world.93

Further, the costs to users of moving from one search platform to another
are exceedingly low. One need not purchase or assemble an additional
product, nor does one need to incur significant costs to learn how to use a new
search engine. 94 Search engines tend to operate similarly and present their
results to users in a comparable manner. Consumer logins are not required to
perform searches, nor is there a coordination problem of trying to get other
users to switch since, as discussed above, there are no direct network effects.
The absence of significant switching costs or network effect lock-in opens the
door for entry-not only for other general search competitors but also for
specialized, "vertical" search competitors. 95 For instance, in product searches,

-

platforms is not the network effect itselfbut hinderances to being able to achieve network effects
that are not based on competitive merit. See discussion infra Section II.C.
89. See, e.g., ACCC REPORT, supra note 16, at 58.
90. Economies of scale occur when the average total cost decreases as output expands;
economies of scope occur when the average total cost ofjointly producing two or more products
is lower than separately producing those products. CRtMER REPORT, supra note 15, at 33
("There are considerable barriers to entry and expansion for search platforms and social media
platforms that entrench and reinforce Google and Facebook's market power. These include
barriers arising from same-side and cross-side network effects, branding, consumer inertia and
switching costs, economies of scale and sunk costs."); id at 54 ("[T]he presence of strong
incumbency advantage - due to network externalities, economies of scale and data access
changes the principles of enforcement of competition policy.").
91. As mentioned at the outset, this Article focuses on network effects as justifications
for new presumptions (or regulations) tend to focus more heavily on network effects over other
characteristics of platforms.
92.

STIGLER REPORT, supra note 17, at 36.

93. See, e.g., Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Just.,
Address Before the Commonwealth Club of California: Innovation and Antitrust (July 29,
1994), https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/innovation-and-antitrust [https://perma.cc/3XDC-8K
EP]; von Weizsacker, supra note 88, at 399.
94. Aaron S. Edlin & Robert G. Harris, The Role ofSwitching Costs in Anti/rustAnalysis:
A Comparison of Microsoft and Google, 15 YALE J.L. & TECH. 169, 197 (2013).
95. See Yun, supra note 66, at 314 (defining vertical search results as "results within a
narrow category").
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Amazon has overtaken Google as the market leader. 96 As previously
discussed, a key feature that limits the propensity of market tipping is product
differentiation. 97 Thus, the idea of the "stickiness of market power" as it
pertains to switching costs does not apply with as much force to search
platforms-irrespective of their market size. 98
C.

Data-Driven Network Effects

What about the argument that there is a different, third type of network
effect caused by platforms' use of large amounts of data? 99 The argument
involves a "virtuous circle" of more users: more users mean more data; more
data means better search results; better search results mean more users. 100 In
other words, having more users benefits existing users through the platform's
access to and use of additional data to improve its product. These effects have
been described as "data-driven indirect network effects." 101 If sufficiently
large and strong, might these create an unstoppable process whereby new
96.

Krista Garcia, More Product Searches Start on Amazon: Google Is Losing its Grip

on Valuable Search Data, EMARKETER (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.emarketer.com/content/mo
re-product-searches-start-on-amazon [https://perma.cc/JQ8W-RF3R] ("A number of consumer
surveys have shown that more US digital shoppers now start their searches on Amazon.").
97. See Katz & Shapiro, supra note 41, at 106.
98. See Edlin & Harris, supra note 94, at 212-13. This is not to say that competing in
online search is easy; there are tremendous resources and financial capital used in creating a
superior search engine. See, e.g., Timothy W. Martin, American Tech FirmsAre Winning the
R&D Spending Race with China, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/am
erican-tech-firms-are-winning-the-r-d-spending-race-with-china-1540873318 [https://perma.cc
/Q93U-57FA]. The question of whether the resources needed to develop quality content should
be considered a "barrier"returns to the larger question of how to define barriers to entry. See
discussion supra note 88. According to the definition offered by von Weizsacker, these resources
would not be considered a barrier to entry because incumbents have no inherent advantage in
developing their content and there are generally no inefficiencies from improving a product. See
von Weizsacker, supra note 88, at 400.
99. See, e.g., FURMAN REPORT, supra note 14, at 33.
100. See id. ("The mechanism through which data provide incumbent businesses with a
competitive advantage is known as a feedback loop.... [U]ser feedback loops occur when
companies collect data from users which they use to improve the quality of their product or
service, which then draws in more users, creating a virtuous circle."); ACCC REPORT, supra
note 16, at 11 ("The multiple touch points that Google and Facebook each have with their users
enable them to collect more user data, improve their services and attract more users and
advertisers, creating a virtuous feedback loop."); STIGLER REPORT supra note 17, at 40 ("A data
advantage over rivals can enable a company to achieve a virtuous circle of critical economies of
scale leading to network effects, and a competitive balance in its favor, leading to the gathering

of yet more data.").
101. Jens Pnifer & Christoph Schottmfller, Competing with Big Data, 68 J. INDUS. ECON.
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 5), http://ssm.com/abstract=2918726 [https://perma.cc/C49
M-7DGC]; see also Cddric Argenton & Jens Prufer, Search Engine Competition with Network
Externalities, 8 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 73, 76 (2012).
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entrants cannot match the search quality of incumbents? And if so, is there a
critical role for competition policy to play in addressing this "barrier"?
This theory of incumbent strength, 10 2 although intuitive, is incomplete.
First, even if this were a complete and convincing argument, it is entirely
premised on increasing quality to users (which increases users' welfare). 103
This, in turn, increases the participation of advertisers (which increases
advertisers' welfare). 104 In other words, increasing product quality makes all
participants on a platform better off-surely something that competition
policy should be encouraging.105 It is a remarkable twist of antitrust logic to
suggest that a practice is ultimately harmful to social welfare (and thus
demands a regulatory solution) simply because it improves a product too
much and hinders entrants' ability to compete on equal terms.106 This harkens
to C.C. von Weizsacker's work on barriers to entry, which can be adapted to
the current debate: What is the point of defining barriers to entry if welfareenhancing activities like improving a product and making it more relevant for
users now constitute a "barrier to entry"? 07 Where does that lead? Innovation
is a barrier to entry. Using machine learning and more data is a barrier to entry.
Hiring talented, skilled individuals and organizing them in a manner to
maximize their productivity is a barrier to entry. Developing a strong brand
name and reputation is a barrier to entry. Having low marginal costs is a

barrier to entry. Effectively, anything that grows one's size or market share is
a barrier to entry.108 When used in this manner, the term "barrier to entry"

becomes meaningless to guide competition policy; yet due to its historic and
colloquial use, the term tends to connote an inability for competitors to enter
and, consequently, results in a loss of welfare for consumers. 109
102. See Prefer & Schottmtller, supra note 101 (manuscript at 2).
103. Id. (manuscript at 1-2).
104. See Traynor, supra note 79.
105. See Argenton & Priifer, supra note 101, at 100.
106. See FURMAN REPORT, supra note 14, at 33-34 ("Data can act as a barrier to entry in
digital markets. A data-rich incumbent is able to cement its position by improving its service
and making it more targeted for users, as well as making more money by better targeting its
advertising.... The extent to which data are of central importance to the offer but inaccessible
to competitors, in terms of volume, velocity or variety, may confer a form of unmatchable
advantage on the incumbent business, making successful rivalry less likely.").
107. See von Weizsacker, supra note 88, at 400.
108. See ACCC REPORT, supra note 16, at 11, 72-73, 76.
109. A well-cited example of improper condemnation of greater efficiency in antitrust is
United States v. Aluminum Co. ofAmerica (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 431 (2d Cir. 1945) ("[Alcoa]
insists that it never excluded competitors; but we can think of no more effective exclusion than
progressively to embrace each new opportunity as it opened, and to face every newcomer with
new capacity already geared into a great organization, having the advantage of experience, trade
connections and the elite of personnel."). While there have been efforts to revitalize the merits
of the Alcoa decision from the lens of raising rivals' costs, John Lopatka and Paul Godek reject

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

19

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 4
324

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 72: 3051

To the extent that data-driven network effects are considered a barrier to
entry, it is important to consider that the end result of a high-quality product
stems from the innovative efforts and attractive offerings of a seller.11 0 In
contrast, direct and indirect network effects supposedly come simply from
being first and fortuitously obtaining a large base of subsequently "locked-in"
customers. For producers to have the right incentives, they should be
rewarded-not punished-for offering consumers high-quality products.
Second, returning to the data-driven network effect theory itself, the
premise that having more data increases the quality of search results almost
certainly holds; yet it is focused too narrowly on a single factor-in this case
data-that improves platform quality. 11 A vector of other factors (y) in
addition to data (m) influence the quality (q) of search results: q = f (m, y).

These factors include the inherent quality of search algorithms,11 2 the number
of advertisements, page design, features (e.g., autocomplete), infrastructure
design,1 1 3 and search speed (i.e., "latency").11 4 It is an open question whether

it is better to have more data or better models;115 although clearly, the goal is
to have both. Yet it points to an important reality: that one cannot simply
presume that large platforms enjoy market success largely because of their
size (in this case via data). Further, data likely has diminishing returns. It is
an empirical question as to when and to what degree diminishing returns set
this recharacterization. John E. Lopatka & Paul E. Godek, Another Look at Alcoa: Raising
Rivals' Costs Does Not Improve the View, 35 J.L. & ECON. 311, 311 (1992).
110. See ACCC REPORT, supra note 16, at 72.
111. See Argenton & Prifer, supra note 101, at 76 (focusing on access to search data as
the determinative factor for success in a competitive digital market).
112. By all accounts, Google's own entry into search and its ability to displace the market
leading incumbents, Yahoo Search and Alta Vista, were due to the superiority of its intellectual
property-namely, the PageRank algorithm. See, e.g., Michael A. Salinger & Robert J.
Levinson, Economics and the FTC's Google Investigation, 46 REV. INDUS. ORG. 25, 31-32
(2015) ("Because PageRank captured aspects of quality as well as relevance, Google generated
results that searchers found far more useful than the results generated by AltaVista and the other
general search engines that were available at the time."). Argenton and Prifer also acknowledge
the importance of algorithms in their modeling. See Argenton & Prufer, supra note 101, at 79.
113. By one account, Google's decision to develop its own software infrastructure (a.k.a.
Google File System) gave it a long-term advantage over Yahoo, which outsourced to NetApp
and was hampered by application-specific solutions rather than using a more flexible, globalapplication approach. See Mohit Aron, Why Google Beat Yahoo in the War for the Internet,
TECHCRUNCH (May 22, 2016, 11:00 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2016/05/22/why-googlebeat-yahoo-in-the-war-for-the-intemet [https://perma.cc/GPK4-N6SB].
114. See Brin & Page, supra note 112, at 115.
115. As a point of illustration, the ImageNet Image Recognition competition is based on
accurately classifying images using training data and an algorithm. Since 2010, the error rate for
the winning entry dropped, from over 25% to well under 5% by 2016 even though the size of
the training data was the same, which indicates that algorithms and computing power were
responsible for the improvements in quality. See Peter Eckersley et al., AI Progress
Measurement, EFF, https://www.eff.org/ai/metrics, [https://perma.cc/YYV8-4UAT].
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in, and this might differ depending on the type of query and the quality of the
algorithms. But there are indications that "big data" is not particularly
scarce.116 Rather, big data is the skill and intellectual property needed to
translate data into something valuable that ultimately drives its utility."
Third, this characterization of data-driven network effects is missing a
key step: more data does not simply result in higher quality search results
without cost-even if the data has not yet reached diminishing returns.1 1 8
Consider the following model. Again, search quality is a function of the
amount of data collected (m) and other factors (y): q =

f(m, y).

Further, the

amount of data collected is a function of the size of the user base (S): q =
f (m(S),y).119 The data-driven network effect idea can be represented as
dq/OS = (dq/dm)(dm/dS) > 0. Thus, when platforms attract more users,
this will increase the amount of data collected (i.e., dm/dS > 0). Further,
with more data, the quality of the search results increases (i.e., dq/dm > 0);
though with diminishing returns, the increase occurs at a decreasing rate, (i.e.,
a 2 q/0m2 < 0). In totality, as the number of users increases, a "chain of
events" begins, ultimately improving the quality of search results (i.e.,
(8q/8m)(dm/dS) > 0).
116. See, e.g., Anja Lambrecht & Catherine Tucker, Can Big Data Protect a Firmfrom
Competition?, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Jan. 2017, at 1, 2 ("This type of commercially available
big data typically has broad reach and coverage, allowing many firms whose business does not
usually generate big data to gain insights similar to those available to firms that own big data on
a large number of customers. There are many examples forvery big commercially available data
sets.").
117. See, e.g., Xavier Amatriain, Mining Large Streams of User Datafor Personalized
Recommendations, 14 SIGKDD ExPLS., Dec. 2012, at 37, 43 ("The previous discussion on
models vs. data has recently become a favorite - and controversial - topic. The improvements
enabled thanks to the availability of large volumes of data together with a certain Big Data 'hype'
have driven many people to conclude that it is 'all about the data'. [sic] But in most cases, data
by itself does not help in making [Netflix's] predictive models better."). Amatriain shows that
Netflix's testing accuracy, under certain scenarios, hits its asymptotic level after just one million
training examples. See id at 44 fig.8. Another study indicates that, while diminishing returns
does set in, there is still value from increasing use of big data; although, it is not clear that the
level of data that even smaller platforms have is insufficient to obtain most of the returns. See
Enric Junque de Fortuny et al., PredictiveModeling with Big Data, 1 BIG DATA 215, 219 (2013)
("[F]or most of the datasets the performance keeps improving even when we sample more than
millions of individuals for training the models. One should note, however, that the curves do
seem to show some diminishing returns to scale."). Focusing on search engines, Professors
Lesley Chiou and Catherine Tucker found that large amounts of historical data may not be
particularly useful for the relevancy of search results. Lesley Chiou & Catherine Tucker, Search
Engines and DataRetention: Implicationsfor Privacy andAntitrust 3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Rsch., Working Paper No. 23815, 2017).
118. See Tucker, supra note 69, at 3.
119. This simple framework is focused on proprietary data collection as opposed to all
types of data that could potentially be used to improve search quality including third-party
data.
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Digging deeper, however, it appears this characterization is, again,

unfinished. It is not whether an input, such as data, can improve search quality
but by how much and at what cost it can do so. 120 The incorporation of a cost
"step"-to transform raw data into actual improvements in search quality-is
critical because it moves the idea of collecting more data away from a strict
"network effect" to more of a "data opportunity." 12 1 This data opportunity is
a production opportunity based on residuals of consumption. 122 Firms that can
take advantage of that opportunity and invest in innovation and quality rightly
achieve a competitive advantage-yet, as with all investments, there is no
certain return. 123
D. Network Effects and Social Media Platforms

Social media, for example Facebook, is also a multisided platform that
brings together users (S) and advertisers (A). 124 Again, the utility of both
groups can be depicted in the following manner:
Users:

US, = f(S)

Advertisers: UA. =

f(A).

120. See Alexander Krzepicki et al., The Impulse to Condemn the Strange: Assessing Big
Data in Antitrust, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Feb. 2020, at 2, 4.

121. See id at 3 ("[A] firm takes the data and transforms it into something that creates
value in the form of lower costs, improved quality, and innovative new products. This stage
involves the task of combining the data with other resources and inputs, such as intellectual
property, skilled labor, and capital infrastructure. Firms will have differential advantages and
skills in this stage.").
122. See Varian, supra note 69, at 232 ("This is not really a network effect, direct or
indirect. It is a supply side effect: more data allows the search engine to produce higher quality
products which in turn attract more users.... Mere data by itself doesn't confer a competitive
advantage; that data has to be translated into information, knowledge, and action.").
123. Otherwise, to use an argumentum ad absurdum, if we accept data-driven network
effects, the next step is to argue for a "revenue-driven network effect," where more users mean
more advertising revenues, which mean more money to improve quality, which means more
users. More generally, as Varian has noted, one could argue: "The higher the number of
customers a business has, the higher the revenue of the business, revenue which can be
reinvested in the maintenance and improvement of the business so as to attract more customers."
Id. at 233 (emphasis omitted). This would mean all a business needs to do is increase revenue
and the business will take care of itself, which is, of course, opposed to manifest experience.
124. The nature of advertising is different on Facebook than it is on Google. Broadly
speaking, online advertisements are differentiated along two dimensions: (1) how users are
targeted and (2) how advertisements are visually formatted. Search advertisements target based
principally on the keywords from user queries. Social media advertisements target based on
context, keywords, and user profiles. Irrespective of the targeting mechanism, advertisements
can have different visual formats including text, display, and video. Thus, users can have, for
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Unlike on an online search platform, a social media user certainly derives
greater utility when there are a greater number of other users (d Us /dS >
0).125 Consequently, there is a direct network effect on the user side. Yet,
similar to the case for an online search platform, advertisers do not benefit
from having additional advertisers join the platform. In fact, the effect is likely
negative (dUA./dA
0). In terms of cross-group effects, similar to online
search, more users increase the benefit to an advertiser from participating on
the platform (dUA/dS > 0). Again, this effect is unidirectional, given that
having more advertisers generally does not materially impact the number of
users: dUst/dA = 0.
Accordingly, there are similarities and differences between social media
platforms (structured in a manner similar to Facebook) and online search
platforms (structured in a manner similar to Google). Both rely on having a
high volume of users that can be monetized through advertisements. 126 Social
media is different, however, in that there is a direct network effect on the user
side. 127 Therefore, while arguments regarding tipping and winner-take-all do

not fit the characteristics of online search especially well, they do carry some
weight when it comes to social media. 128 This has led many to conclude that
Facebook's current leading position in social media is uncontestable. 129
First, this argument is flawed in that it follows a "one size fits all"
approach to network effects. For social media, the contours of the direct
network effect are different in strength and scope compared to prior
communication networks, such as the telephone, fax machine, and e-mail.130

instance, a contextual-display advertisement or even a search-display advertisement. The
convention, however, is to use "display advertisements" to refer to non-search advertisements.
See Yun, supra note 66, at 319 n.33.
125. Although, there are also potential "herding effects" on social media (i.e., the desire to
communicate with a certain subset of people). This can lead platforms to have certain
governance and features that facilitate herding such as private groups or accounts. It can also
lead to differentiated entry, marketing, orboth (e.g., Snapchatwiththose under twenty-five years
old). As the desire to be connected with certain groups get stronger, one would expect to see
more differentiated platforms catering to specific groups.
126. See id at 61.
127. See id at 79.
128. See id at 78-79.
129. See, e.g., FURMAN REPORT, supra note 14, at 37 ("Facebook's persistent dominance
is supported by strong direct network effects."); ACCC REPORT, supra note 16, at 11 ("Yet
access to data is not the sole barrier to entering these markets. For example, the social media
market, dominated by Facebook's platforms, demonstrates strong network effects that are
independent of the amount of user data Facebook collects. The value of Facebook to individual
users depends on the participation of other users (particularly family and friends) and groups.").
130. See ACCC REPORT, supra note 16, at 67.
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Second, a closer examination of numerous factors suggests that barriers to
entry in social media fall quite short of insurmountable. 13 1
In a prior era where the landline telephone system was the principal
method of voice communication, network effects were rightly considered the
central feature driving adoption and participation. 132 A telephone system is a
standard that involves an immense amount of coordination, including
substantial investments in hardware and infrastructure.

133

Not surprisingly,

given the degree of lock-in, switching costs, and the need to coordinate such
a switch, there was little in the way of alternative systems. 134
The strength and scope of network effects on social media are materially
different. Professor Catherine Tucker's research reveals that network effects
on social media are "local" in that what affects the utility of users is a small
set of other users-for example, friends, relatives, coworkers, and
classmates-rather than the public at large. 135 In some respects, this point is
true even for telephones, fax machines, and e-mail. For example, fax machines
first grew in scale and viability in newsrooms and the military-rather than as
a mass market product. 136 Fundamentally, a fax machine is still useful as long
as there are two users who want to communicate with one another. 137 In

&

131. See Krzepicki et al., supra note 120, at 2.
132. The concept of network effects in the economics literature began with models
assessing potential equilibria in the telephone system. See Roland Artle & Christian Averous,
The Telephone System as a Public Good: Static and Dynamic Aspects, 4 BELL J. ECON.
MGMT. SCI. 89 (1973); Jeffrey Rohlfs, A Theory of Interdependent Demand for a
CommunicationsService, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 16 (1974).

133. See Rohlfs, supra note 132, at 18.
134. At the time of Alexander Graham Bell's telephone innovation, the established means
of communication was the telegraph system. While the multiple telegraph was being developed
to potentially replace the telegraph, the superiority of the telephone system (the harmonic
telegraphic) marked "the death of the multiple telegraph as well." Telephone and Multiple
Telegraph, LIBR. OF CONG., https://www.loc.gov/collections/alexander-graham-bell-papers/arti
cles-and-essays/telephone-and-multiple-telegraph [https://perma.ccIHH2Z-8Y29]. Nonetheless,
this is another instance of innovation dynamically working with the telephone replacing the

telegraph.
135. Tucker, supra note 69, at 2-3 ("In the few forums where there are same-sided network
effects, such as social media websites, my research suggests that these type of network effects
are quite local. This means that they depend only on the user's smaller friend-group and do not
depend on the user base of the entire platform.").
136. Eg., Keith Randall, The Rise and Fallofthe FaxMachine, TEX. A&M TODAY (Aug.
6, 2015), https://today.tamu.edu/2015/08/06/the-rise-and-fall-of-the-fax-machine [https://perma
.cc/YJR6-BU9F].
137. Even today, the fax machine is still frequently used in real estate firms, pharmacies,
and the medical industry. See id.; Lloyd Minor, Why Your Doctor's Office Still Depends on a
Fax Machine, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 19, 2019), https://blogs.wsj.com/experts/2019/09/19/whyyour-doctors-office-still-depends-on-a-fax-machine [https://perma.cc/V852-QNTP]. Like the
fax machine, digital communication platforms need only two users to be useful. STIGLER
REPORT, supra note 17, at 38 n.51 ("To send a message to someone, a user only needs that single
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essence, the value of a platform is more a function of who is on the platform
instead of the sheer number ofpeople on it. 138 Thus, coordinating migration

to a new or alternative network is not necessarily a significant hinderance if
the primary value from joining a network is derived from a relatively small
group of people. 139

Further, social media platforms have important characteristics that
suggest barriers to entry are far from insurmountable and are significantly
more modest than commonly asserted: products are highly differentiated;1 40
switching costs are minimal;1 4 1 infrastructure and start-up costs are low; 142
and advertisers (and, thus, monetization) follow users-not vice versa-thus
significantly mitigating concerns regarding advertiser stickiness. 143 These

characteristics are discussed below, and the subsequent section details how
some of the empirical evidence is consistent with the testable implications that
follow.
The first factor that facilitates entry is the high level of differentiation
between social media products. 144 This is self-evident from examining some
of the top social media sites: Facebook, Instagram (Facebook), Pinterest,
Snapchat, LinkedIn, Twitter, and WhatsApp (Facebook). 145 An entrant might
start with a basic product that fulfills a certain niche in the market and then
proceed to add new features, expand into adjacent markets, or change its
overall business strategy. 146 While social media is largely defined by the
person to be on a particular messaging app, rather than everyone they would want to send a
message to. This explains why many messaging applications can live alongside one another
WhatsApp, Snapchat, SMS, and Facebook Messenger all have significant customer bases.").
138. Increases in the sheer number of users analogous to the income effect in
economics also bring in more people in each subgroup.
139. Relatedly, there are diminishing returns to network effects. For instance, in discussing
indirect network effects for videocassette recorders (VCRs), Liebowitz and Margolis stated:
[T]he fact that other people use the same sort of VCR that we use makes a tape rental
market available to us, but the marginal benefits of increasing the number of
households that own our kind of VCR are likely exhausted now that businesses that
rent videotapes are about as prevalent as ones that sell milk.
Network Externality, supra note 59, at 140.

140. See Edison Rsch., The Social Habit 2019, EDISON RScH.: BLOG (May 30, 2019),
https://www.edisonresearch.com/the-social-habit-2019
[https://perma.cc/W9RL-D3SZ]
(summarizing the findings of a 2019 study of social media user habits and how those habits are
influenced by differences between platforms).
141. See Tucker, supra note 65, at 78 (describing social media users quick switch from
My Space to Facebook).
142. See FURMAN REPORT, supra note 14, at 3.
143. See ACCC REPORT, supra note 16, at 79.
144. See Edison Rsch., supra note 140.
145. See id
146. The story of Facebook itself is illustrative of this point. Facebook began as a platform
for high school and college students to communicate with each other through public and private
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presence of other users, 147 this is not the only factor that drives users to join
and, importantly, to actively participate. Further, given that the level of
discourse and interaction on social media is more visible and multifaceted
relative to prior communication networks (e.g., the telephone and fax
machine), the herding effects of users joining and interacting with specific
groups incentivize platform differentiation. 148 In fact, differentiation is a
central consideration when venture capitalists are looking to fund start-ups. 149
Even with the presence of direct and indirect network effects, both of which
are present on Facebook's platform, 150 user participation levels still depend
on the value that consumers derive from the product, which can include
differentiated features like news feeds and other forms of platform curation. 151
Due to the importance of differentiation, one ought not fall victim to a
need to replicate fallacy based on the idea that in order to be successful, entry
must occur at the same level, scope, and type as the current incumbent.152
Because entrants generally cannot quickly match the number of users and data
posts on each user's virtual "wall." Tucker, supra note 65, at 79. Over time, however, Facebook
incorporated features that changed the nature of the platform. For instance, today, Facebook
represents a source of news for two-thirds of users. Jeffrey Gottfried & Elisa Shearer, News Use
Across Social Media Platforms 2016, PEW RScH. CTR. (May 26, 2016),
https://www.joumalism.org/2016/05/26/news-use-across-social-media-platforms-2016 [https://
perma.cc/QT96-PDDY]. To some extent, the ACCC Report acknowledges that "same-side
network effects may not preclude the entry of a niche or differentiated social media platform."
ACCC REPORT, supra note 16, at 79. The ACCC Report continues: "[S]ame-side network
effects do not preclude the entry of smaller rivals, such as Snapchat, which appeal to specific
groups. If such rivals are able to expand the breadth of their appeal, they may provide a challenge
to Facebook's dominance in the provision of social media services." Id at 84.
147. See ACCC REPORT, supra note 16, at 41.
148. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
149. In her Senate testimony, venture capitalist Patricia Nakache stated:
When evaluating a startup looking to compete directly against a large incumbent,
[venture capitalists] will seek to understand whether the founder has a unique and
important insight into the market which is driving the development of a differentiated
product or service, whether she has crafted a marketing and sales strategy that will
enable the startup to grow quickly, and whether the leadership team of the startup can
execute nimbly against larger competitors.
Competition in Digital Technology Markets: Examining Acquisitions of Nascent or Potential
Competitors by DigitalPlatformsBefore the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,Subcomm. on Antitrust,
Competition Poly, & Consumer Rts., 116th Cong. 4 (2019) (written testimony of Patricia
Nakache, General Partner, Trinity Ventures). Nakache also expressed the belief that "many
young companies cannot realistically achieve the scale necessary to become standalone public
companies, which means that often M&A is the most viable pathway for a startup." Id. at 5.
150. See ACCC REPORT, supra note 16, at 79.
151. For the importance of curation for platform engagement, see Anindya Ghose et al.,
Designing Ranking Systems for Hotels on Travel Search Engines by

Mining User-Generated

and Crowd-Sourced Content, 31 MKTG. SCI. 493, 493 (2012).
152. See, e.g., ACCC REPORT, supra note 16, at 9 ("The size of Facebook's audience is
more than three times larger than the size of Snapchat's audience (the closest competitor to the
Facebook platforms). This network effect creates a significant barrier to entry and expansion.").
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generated by the most successful social media platforms, one might be led too
readily to conclude that there are insurmountable barriers to entry created by
network effects and economies of scale and scope.153 Yet an examination of
the actual entry experience of the current incumbents such as Facebook,
Google, and Amazon belie this claim. "4 Generally, leading platforms entered
the market with a differentiated product that evolved, was added to, and was
improved over time.

155

In a similar way, it is faulty antitrust logic to suggest

that since entrants cannot immediately replicate the size and scope of
incumbents, entry will not occur, and consequently, firms will be unable to
expand. 156
Entry is also facilitated through low switching costs.157 Unlike in the
1990s and in Microsoft or IBM's "Big Blue" era, technology has changed;
consumers are no longer tied to specific proprietary hardware or operating
systems. 158 They can now efficiently access and utilize alternative platforms

without losing the benefits of training costs they have already incurred or
applications they have invested in or may wish to choose from. 159 For
instance, during the recent economic lockdown from COVID-19,
videoconferencing applications were an important and significant
beneficiary. 160 There is no doubt this growth was facilitated by the ability of
nearly everyone to immediately join and interact regardless of their operating
system or hardware. 161 This illustrates that these days, the only serious
requirement for access to a new or competing platform is a network

153. See id at 58.
154. Darren S. Tucker & Hill B. Wellford, Big Mistakes Regarding Big Data, ANTITRUST
SOURCE, Dec. 2014, at 1, 7.
155. See id at 8.
156. See id at 7 ("The fact that some established online firms collect a large volume of
data from their customers or other sources does not mean that new entrants must have the same
quantity or type of data in order to enter and compete effectively.... [L]ack of asset equivalence
should not be a sufficient basis to define a barrier to entry.").
157. See Tucker, supra note 69, at 4.
158. For an early and non-technical discussion of the issues that lead to the Microsoft case,
see Stuart Taylor Jr., What to Do with the Microsoft Monster, AM. LAW., Nov. 1993, at 72.
159. In other words, there is an absence of platform specific investments. See Tucker,
supra note 65, at 77, 78 ("[P]latforms that exhibit network effects may be completely virtual.
Nowhere is this shift more striking than in the world of purely digital platforms (such as social
networks, ride-sharing applications, or digital marketplaces), which do not depend on any one
type of hardware and, as a consequence, have low learning costs and require few direct
investments from users.").
160. See Lexi Sydow, Video Conferencing Apps Surge from CoronavirusImpact, APP

ANNIE (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.appannie.com/en/insights/market-data/video-conferencing
-apps-surge-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/4X4N-3XC2].
161. See id
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connection. 162 Thus, switching platforms merely comes down to setting up a
new user account. 163

If switching costs are low, a significant level of multi-homing should be
expected. Multi-homing is the practice of using multiple platforms for a
similar purpose over a given period of time. 164 Even the Furman Report,

which is otherwise quite skeptical of the marketplace's ability to constrain
large incumbent platforms, acknowledges that low switching costs can
overcome network effects. 165 Entry is further facilitated by the relatively low
infrastructure and start-up costs required of new entrants. 166 With the advent
and ubiquity of cloud computing, new entrants no longer need to make large
upfront capital investments in servers and software; rather, cloud computing
can now scale with the business. 167
162. See id
163. One might argue that there is a "legacy" of prior history and activity on a platform
that prevents switching. While this is likely true at some level, actual market experience suggests
social networks can build up and unravel quite quickly. See Tucker, supra note 65, at 78.
("[W]hat is striking is that one might have expected MySpace to exhibit switching costs, due to
the time that users had invested in setting up and personalizing their profiles and establishing
their networks. However, that 'sunk cost' was rendered negligible when MySpace users' friends
migrated to Facebook.").
164. See id 78-79.
165. See FURMAN REPORT, supra note 14, at 35 ("Network effects do not guarantee
concentration, as they can be overcome where consumers and businesses have the freedom to
either switch between services, or use multiple services simultaneously.").
166. The Next Web estimates that an Instagram-like application costs $100,000 to
$300,000 to develop; a Twitter-like application costs $50,000 to $250,000 to develop; and a
Facebook-like application costs $500,000 to develop. Courtney Boyd Myers, How Much Does
It Cost to Build the World's Hottest Startups?, NEXT WEB (Dec. 2, 2013),
https://thenextweb.com/dd/2013/12/02/much-cost-build-worlds-hottest-startups [https://perma.
cc/KQ63-PWFK]. In comparison, to start a craft brewery, the brewing equipment alone costs
between $100,000 and $1 million. See Steve Nicastro, Live Your Dream: How to Start a Craft
Brewery, MARKETWATCH (Mar. 24, 2017, 11:24 AM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/liv
Of
[https://perma.cc/B2JC-T7P4].
e-your-dream-how-to-start-a-craft-brewery-2017-03-24
course, the particular entry conditions will clearly depend on the specific market circumstances;
however, there is no a priori reason to believe that entry costs are particularly high for online
platforms. See Tucker & Wellford, supra note 154, at 8.
167. Related to the discussion of switching costs are regulatory proposals that mandate
data portability between platforms, where the goal is to further reduce switching costs to
facilitate the use of rival platforms. Some digital reports see the potential benefits from imposing
data portability. See, e.g., CRtMER REPORT, supra note 15, at 8 ("[A] more stringent data
portability regime can be imposed on a dominant firm in order to overcome particularly
pronounced lock-in effects." (emphasis omitted)). Others have reservations. See ACCC REPORT,
supra note 16, at 11 ("The ACCC considers that data portability is unlikely to have a significant
effect on barriers to entry .... "). While regulating portability has arguably worked in other areas
(e.g., mobile phone number portability), there are reasons to be skeptical of its efficacy in social
media. First, there is a lack of sound empirical evidence that data portability is actually hindering
the use of alternate social media platforms. Second, there are clear privacy implications for a
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While switching costs might be relatively low for users, perhaps they are
higher for advertisers. This can create some degree of advertiser "stickiness"
for platforms, which could impede the ability of advertisers to switch to
alternative platforms. 168 If advertiser stickiness exists, this may give the
incumbent some degree of market power. 169 It is certainly plausible that
switching costs are higher for advertisers than for users.170 Inevitably, some
advertisers may need to sink significant resources into a given platform in
order to maximize their return.
It is a key empirical question for any antitrust investigation involving two-

sided platforms to determine the level of multi-homing on each side. 1" Yet it
is worth emphasizing that the indirect network effect goes from users to
advertisers. 172 As with search engines, advertisers go where users are. 173 If a
platform can achieve a critical mass of certain types of users whom advertisers
wish to target, this creates a powerful ability to monetize. Given this ability
for consumers to switch easily, considerations of advertiser switching coststo the extent they are higher than user switching costs-would appear to be
distinctly secondary considerations in a competitive assessment.
E.

Evidence on the Ability of Entrants to Compete in DigitalMarkets

If products are differentiated, switching costs are minimal, infrastructure
and start-up costs are relatively low, and monetization follows users, then
what observations are expected? Users and advertisers would use more than
one social media platform (i.e., they would multi-home). 7 4 Even smaller
user or business porting their social media data (including contacts and, for businesses, user
reviews) from one platform to another including questions of consent from their contacts and
customers. Third, it is not entirely clear the value that users place on data from past social
interactions what seems more relevant are future interactions, which require the users' groups
of friends and family to actually migrate as well. Finally, the boundaries of such a regulation
could easily expand into "interoperability," introducing a new host of regulatory concerns. For
more on the costs of regulating data portability. See, e.g., Peter Swire & Yianni Lagos, Why the
Right to DataPortabilityLikely Reduces Consumer Welfare: Antitrust andPrivacy Critique, 72
MD. L. REv. 335, 353-65 (2013).
168. See ACCC REPORT, supra note 16, at 96.
169. See id at 95.
170. Id. at 96.
171. Tucker, supra note 65, at 78. I have not seen a systematic set of studies that examines
the question of multi-homing on the part of advertisers. It would be particularly interesting to
determine whether multi-homing statistics differ depending on the characteristics of each
advertiser (e.g., spending levels) and the type of queries or content in which they advertise.
172. ACCC REPORT, supra note 16, at 63-64.
173. Id. at 64.
174. See The State ofMobile 2019, APP ANNIE (2019), https://www.appannie.com/en/go/st
ate-of-mobile-2019/ [https://perma.cc/DK54-U9XY] (finding that the average consumer has
over 100 applications on their smartphone (slide 13)).
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platforms would be expected to represent a threat to larger platforms.17 5
Similarly, the size of a network itself would not be expected to determine the
success or failure of a platform.17 6
As for the empirical data, user multi-homing is widespread. 1 7 7 The
average consumer has over 100 applications on their smartphone, with about
thirty to forty applications being used per month.17 8 The most common
services where multiple providers are used include online shopping (81%),
travel planning and booking (72%), messaging (70%), social and sharing
platforms (65%), web browsers (64%), and music streaming (61%).179 For

multi-homing to be an effective competitive constraint, it is not necessary that
multiple accounts be used regularly. Rather, evidence of pervasive multihoming suggests that the degree of market power is potentially overstated
based solely on measuring market share. 180
Smaller social networks are also creating rivalry for incumbents. 181
Snapchat is used more intensely per user than all other social media messaging
applications in the United States, including Facebook, Instagram, Messenger,

and Pinterest.18 2 Among users aged twelve to seventeen, Snapchat is the
market leader with 16.4 million users, while Instagram and Facebook are
second and third with 12.8 million and 11.5 million, respectively. 183 Even for
broader age ranges, among ages twelve to thirty-four, Snapchat went from
15% of Facebook's usage to virtually equal usage in just four years (from
175. See Edison Rsch., The Social Habit2019, EDISON RSCH. (May 2019) [hereinafter The
Social Habit], http://www.edisonresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/The-Social-Habit2019-from-Edison-Research.pdf [https://perma.cc/27LP-NZFC] (slide 38).
176. Tucker, supra note 65, at 77. Another implication is that, if barriers to ently are
actually low, then the quality adjusted price to advertise on Facebook should be relatively
constant over time all else equal. I only propose this test at a conceptual level because I have
not seen a study directly address this question. The most likely reason it has not been addressed
is that it is an incredibly difficult exercise to establish proper causality. One measure that could
fold-in changing quality is a price such as cost per engagement, cost per lead, or cost per click.
This could standardize quality changes over time. The difficulty is controlling for Facebook's
costs of hosting and displaying advertising over time. Further, demand is also changing so the
study would need to control for the number of advertisers who wish to advertise on social media,
which, independent of monopoly power, would result in a higher price.
177. See The State ofMobile 2019, supra note 174 (slide 13).
178. Id.
179. See DELOITTE, THE DATA LANDSCAPE: A REPORT FOR FACEBOOK 23 fig.23 (2017),

https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/technology-media-telecommu
nications/deloitte-uk-tmt-the-data-landscape.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WCX-TKCL].
180. See Tucker, supra note 65, at 78. On this point, conduct that is primarily intended to
restrict the ability of consumers to multi-home should rightly receive antitrust scrutiny.
181. See Edison Rsch., supra note 140.
182. See The State ofMobile 2019, supra note 174 (slide 48).
183. Facebook Is Tops with Everyone but Teens, EMARKETER (Aug. 28, 2018),
https://www.emarketer.com/content/facebook-is-tops-with-everyone-but-teens [https://perma.

cc/8LHE-86X4].
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2015 to 2019).184 TikTok is a social media platform that was launched in
China in 2016 and in the United States in 2017; TikTok now has over 1 billion
active monthly users, 185 and at one point, it was the most downloaded
application in the U.S. Apple Store for five consecutive quarters. 186
Implicitly, those that are calling for greater regulatory controls over large
platforms purchasing start-ups (based on a potential and nascent competition
theory of harm) acknowledge that smaller platforms can quickly scale up and
mature into major competitors to incumbents. 187 Facebook's purchase of
Instagram illustrates this theory of harm. However, if Instagram was a
potential threat to Facebook, smaller social networks in existence today could
certainly be as well. 188 Unlike claims made about the unique threat Netscape
arguably posed to Microsoft's dominance in the 1990s, 189 potential threats to
large existing platforms do not seem to be particularly unique.
Further, if the absolute size of a user base does not dictate the success of
a platform, then larger platforms would be expected to fail even with a large
user base. This is precisely what has been observed. Many established
platforms have lost their market leading positions: Friendster, Yahoo,
MySpace, Internet Explorer, Firefox, Pandora, and iTunes.1 90 Another

184. See The Social Habit, supra note 175 (slide 26).
185. Georgia Wells et al., TikTok's Videos Are Goofy. Its Strategy to Dominate Social
Media Is Serious, WALL ST. J. (June 29, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tiktoks-videosare-goofy-its-strategy-to-dominate-social-media-is-serious-11561780861 [https://perma.cc/W
HH4-Y3VQ]; Sherisee Pham, The Company That Owns TikTok Now Has One Billion Users and
ManyAre Outside China, CNN (June 20,2019,8:13 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/20/tec
h/tiktok-bytedance-users/index.html [https://perma.cc/7W2F-ZMZM].
186. Pham, supra note 185; see also Brandon Doyle, TikTok Statistics - Updated October
2020, WALLAROO (Oct. 6, 2020), htps://wallaroomedia.com/blog/social-media/tiktok-statistics
[https://perma.cc/JS74-7RS9].
187. See, e.g., ACCC REPORT, supra note 16, at 80.
188. See John M. Yun et al., Comment of the Global Antitrust Institute, Australian

Competition & Consumer Commission's Digital Platforms Inquiry, Preliminary Report, 15
(Geo. MasonUniv. L. & Econ. Rsch. Paper Series, PaperNo. 19-04, 2019), https://ssm.com/abst
ract=3321837 [https://perma.cc/UN9K-AJLS] ("Central to the narrative that strategic
acquisitions have entrenched market power is Facebook's acquisition of Instagram in 2012, from
which some commentators have inferred that competition authorities are missing potential
competition cases. At the time of the acquisition, Instagram had zero revenues and a handful of
employees. Since Facebook's acquisition, Instagram has grown from 30 million users to well
over one billion. During the same period, Facebook grew from approximately 900 million users
to over two billion users. This substantial expansion in users and output is hardly indicative of
an anticompetitive outcome.").
189. See Benjamin Klein, The Microsoft Case: What Can a DominantFirm Do to Defend
Its MarketPosition?, J. ECON. PERSPS., Spring 2001, at 45, 45.
190. See Tucker, supra note 65, at 78.
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example is Google+, which launched in 2011 with a large built-in user base.1 91
At that time, Google stated: "We're transforming Google itself into a social
destination at a level and scale that we've never attempted-orders of
magnitude more investment, in terms of people, than any previous project."

192

According to Massachusetts Institute of Technology economist Catherine
Tucker, Google+ was primed for success. 193 Instead, Google+ ceased to
operate as a consumer product on April 2, 2019.194 Google acknowledged that
Google+ "ha[d] low usage and engagement: 90% of Google+ user sessions

are less than five seconds." 195 Relevantly, even though Google+ enjoyed
direct network effects with an initial "seed" of 90 million users, 196 it still
failed. The clear lesson is that the relative and absolute size of a social network
does not deliver market success.
In sum, social network platforms exhibit some characteristics that
facilitate, rather than impede, entry. Of course, there are hindrances to
instantaneously matching the size and scope of current market incumbents.
This is not, however, evidence that barriers to entry are seriously impeding
competition. Instantaneous large entry is costly and unusual in most nondigital markets as well. 197 Further, smaller platforms hoping to gradually gain
further traction-or at least those that are well-positioned to do so should
market leaders falter-have been able to survive alongside their more
successful rivals.198 Success and growth take time, yet there is no reason to
take this as evidence of a systemic problem with a given market or industry,
much less one that requires a new set of presumptions for digital platforms.
191. See Vic Gundotra, Introducing the Google+ Project:Real-Life Sharing, Rethought
for the Web, GOGGLE BLOG (June 28, 2011), https://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/06/introdu
cing-google-project-real-life.html [https://perma.cc/8KPV-GEDE]; Tucker, supra note 65, at
78.
192. Steven Levy, Inside Google+-

How the Search Giant Plans to Go Social, WIRED,

(June 28, 2011, 1:10PM), https://www.wired.com/2011/06/inside-google-plus-social [https://pe
rma.cc/L8S4-6N5D].
193. See Tucker, supra note 65, at 78 ("Google Plus enjoyed the support of over 1,000
employees (including top engineers), as well as CEO support. In theory, Google Plus should
have had network effects and consequent critical mass on its side. This is because it was able to
'seed' its initial social network with 90 million users through the integration of other Google
services, such as YouTube, in its signup process.").
194. Shutting Down Google+ for Consumer (Personal) Accounts on April 2, 2019,

GOGGLE (Jan. 30, 2019), https://support.google.com/plus/answer/9195133?hl=en&ref_topic=9
259565 [https://perma.cc/2MZ2-E9EQ].
and

195. Ben Smith, ProjectStrobe: ProtectingYour Data, Improving Our Third-PartyAPIs,
Sunsetting
Consumer
Google+,
GOOGLE
BLOG
(Oct.
8,
2018),

https://www.blog.google/technology/safety-security/project-strobe [https://perma.cc/VNV7-B8
UX].
196. Tucker, supra note 65, at 78.
197. See, e.g., Gregory J. Werden, Network Effects and Conditions ofEntry: Lessonsfrom

the Microsoft Case, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 87, 92 (2001).
198. See Tucker, supra note 65, at 78.
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III. EXAMINING ALLEGEDLY ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT FROM LEADING
PLATFORMS

As discussed, a key pillar used to justify sweeping policy changes to
current antitrust enforcement is the presumed role that network effects play in
creating insurmountable barriers to digital market entry. Even if these claims
were accurate, network effects are simply characteristics of platforms and do
not represent actual conduct in and of themselves. Consequently, at least
under existing antitrust enforcement, network effects cannot serve as a basis
for finding an anticompetitive violation. 199 Therefore, some academic
research and the digital reports offer a litany of potentialtypes of misconduct
that market power-protected by substantial network effects-might allow
the firm to engage in. 200 The thinking here is that when a firm has so much
market power and entry barriers are so high, one simply cannot afford to take
chances and allow current antitrust presumptions to continue. 20 1
Proving violations can be difficult; thus, it is better to change existing
presumptions regarding the welfare effects of various platform practices to
allow plaintiffs to meet their ultimate burden of persuasion more easily. This
part examines two commonly alleged examples of dominant platforms
abusing their market power: (1) giving preference to their own content

through private label entry and promotion and (2) setting defaults. While the
focus is on an evaluation of these two specific practices, the broader point is
that antitrust laws are fully capable of addressing the various theories of harm
involving platforms without the need to implement new presumptions.
A.

Is PreferencingOne's Own Content a Competition Problem?

Examples of preferencing include Google using its own map, rather than
Apple Maps or MapQuest, to answer local business queries; 202 Google

Android being defaulted to Google search over Bing; 203 and Amazon

199. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 50, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per
curiam). Further, there is certainly no basis, based on the current evidence, that courts should
implement a presumption that network effects create barriers to entry and insulate monopoly
power from competition.
200. See, e.g., Khan, supra note 12, at 737-39 (highlighting a number of anticompetitive
harms that the current antitrust system does not address).
201. See id at 737.
202. See Adi Robertson, Congress Takes Aim at Google Search in Antitrust Hearing, THE
VERGE (Mar. 10, 2020, 3:26 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/3/10/21173077/congressantitrust-google-search-klobuchar-bill-letter-monopoly.
203. Google Complaint, supra note 10, at 42.
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promoting its own private label brands over those of third-party merchants. 204
Numerous digital
competition. 205

reports

condemn

preferencing

as

detrimental

to

Given that preferencing is inherently about favoring one's own content
and products over a rival's, this theory of harm has some degree of appeal for
a platform that has substantial market share and perhaps market power. Thus,
although some of the digital reports acknowledge (in passing) that the conduct
can be potentially beneficial, 206 the ultimate conclusion remains one of
condemnation. 207

Is this judgment justified? Is preferencing one's own content likely to be
a competition problem, and if so, under what circumstances? 208 The standard
claim is that preferencing allows a platform with market power to steer users
away from competing and rival products that rely on their platform to make
sales-depriving them of the scale required to remain viable or fully efficient
and thereby eliminating or seriously weakening competitors in a different,
adjacent market. 209 The core idea is that because the platform is playing both

204. We need not limit ourselves to platforms to consider the strength and importance of
preferencing. Consider the Sears, Roebuck and Company's mail-order catalog which was, in
its heyday, the Amazon of its time selling a variety of merchandise including its own branded
products. There is little doubt that rival merchants would have benefited from the ability to be
included in the catalog. Sears eventually lost its crown as the top retailer in the United States in
1991 to Walmart. See Sarah Pruitt, When the Sears Catalog Sold Everything from Houses to
Hubcaps, HISTORY (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.history.com/news/sears-catalog-houseshubcaps [https://perma.cc/CH9X-4KH4].
205. See FURMAN REPORT, supra note 14, at 61 ("[T]he Panel considers to be unfair or
unreasonable conduct . . a platform that contains a search function giving an unfair advantage
to its own services over its rivals in downstream markets through the ranking or presentation of
results."); CRtMER REPORT, supra note 15, at 7 ("[S]elf-preferencing by a vertically integrated
dominant digital platform can be abusive not only under the preconditions set out by the
'essential facility' doctrine, but also wherever it is likely to result in leveraging of market power
and is not justified by a pro-competitive rationale.").
206. See, e.g., CRMER REPORT, supra note 15, at 6 (explaining that "imposing farreaching conduct rules on all platforms, irrespective of market power, could not be justified,
given that many types of conduct including potentially self-preferencing may have procompetitive effects."). Yet the implication remains that self-preferencing coupled with market
power is justifiably condemnable.
207. See id at 7.
208. Our best precedent is likely the DOJ's Microsoft case in the late 1990s and early
2000s. The case involved, inter alia, Microsoft preferencing Internet Explorer its own web
browser over Netscape on its desktop Windows operating system through various restrictive
practices and settings, including making it difficult for users to change the default away from
Internet Explorer or delete the program. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 45
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
209. See FURMAN REPORT, supra note 14, at 31.
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the role of "host" as well as competitor, there is an antitrust conflict of interest
with harmful consequences for competition and consumers. 210
Concerns regarding preferencing and foreclosure (or raising rivals' costs)
are not new. These are often the leading theories of harm for vertical mergers
(e.g., the DOJ's case against AT&T-Time Warner). 21 1 The idea is that a
vertically integrated firm will favor its own upstream input over those of rivals
who depend on the downstream unit for distribution, which can lead to either
full or partial foreclosure. 212 This potential for "inputforeclosure" also played
a leading role in Comcast-NBCU's merger. 213 Vertical mergers, however, can
also lead to significant benefits, including the elimination of doublemarginalization. 2" Therefore, vertical mergers are considered under a "rule
of reason" analysis, which involves fully weighing both the potential
anticompetitive and procompetitive effects. 215
The genesis for much of the recent attention given to vertical integration,
preferencing, and platforms is Lina Khan's widely cited article, Amazon's
Antitrust Paradox.2 16 In it, she writes:

Amazon has responded to popular third-party products by
producing them itself. Last year, a manufacturer that had been selling
an aluminum laptop stand on Marketplace for more than a decade
saw a similar stand appear at half the price. The manufacturer learned
that the brand was AmazonBasics, the private line that Amazon has
been developing since 2009 ....

210. See CREMER REPORT, supra note 15, at 66 ("In cases of vertically integrated
dominant digital platforms in markets with particularly high barriers to entry, and where the
platform serves as an intermediation infrastructure of particular relevance, we propose that . .
[the platform] should bear the burden of proving that self-preferencing has no long-run
exclusionary effects on product markets.").
211. United States v. AT&T Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161, 164 (D.D.C. 2018).
212. Jonathan B. Baker, Comcast/NBCU: The FCC Provides a Roadmap for Vertical
Merger Analysis, 25 ANTITRUST, Spring 2011, at 36, 37.
213. See id
214. Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries:
The Evidence, 45 J. ECON. LITERATURE 629, 664 (2007); see also James C. Cooper et al.,
VerticalAntitrust Policy as a Problem ofInference, 23 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 639, 641 (2005).
215. See Thomas A. Piraino Jr., An Antitrust Common Law for the Twenty-First Century,

2009 UTAH L. REV. 635, 642.
216. Khan, supra note 12, at 710; see also David Streitfeld, Amazon 'sAntitrustAntagonist
Has a Breakthrough Idea, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/07/
technology/monopoly-antitrust-lina-khan-amazon.html [https://perma.cc/9PC3-NP98].
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In using its Marketplace this way, Amazon increases sales while
. . . The anticompetitive implications here seem clear:
Amazon is exploiting the fact that some of its customers are also its
rivals. 217
shedding risk.

This quote reveals that Amazon is itself a new entrant into various product
markets-including laptop stands. 2 18 This quote further reveals that
Amazon's entry caused prices to fall dramatically and that Amazon's private
label entry "increase[d] sales while shedding risk." 219 Greater output and
lower prices are, of course, beneficial to consumers and to the economy as a
whole, despite the fact that rivals may wish the entrant had stayed out.
Nevertheless, the conclusion is that: "The anticompetitive implications here
seem clear." 220 While it is most certainly clear that Amazon and its customers
are better off, it seems far less clear that any of this is anticompetitive.
While harm to rivals is a component of almost every anticompetitive
theory of harm (e.g., foreclosure and predatory pricing), the ultimate arbiter is
the impact on consumers. 221 Therefore, some caution must be exercised in
overly focusing on the notion that rivals are harmed from a certain business
practice; the claim that harm to rivals, in of itself, constitutes harm to the
competitive process is one that was long ago-and properly-discarded by
antitrustjurisprudence. 222 Firms in a free market do not possess a "right" to

make sales at prices they might wish to charge. 223 It is not overstating to say
that policies favoring competitors over competition turn antitrustpolicy on its

head and impede, rather than protect, the competitive process. 22 4
The purpose of federal antitrust laws is to safeguard the competitive
process-not to dictate market outcomes or protect rivals. 22 5 In Verizon
Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko, LLP, the Supreme

Court stated:

217. Khan, supra note 12, at 782-83.
218. My focus is on whether the entry itself is an antitrust concern. Whether Amazon
entered by violating a rival's intellectual property rights is a separate matter and consideration.
219. See id at 781-82.
220. Id. at 783.
221. John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust:
Protecting Consumers, Not IncreasingEfficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191, 196 (2008).
222. Id. at 93-94.
223. See Werden, supra note 197, at 97-99.
224. Some digital reports are transparent in this goal. For a discussion of the need for
"fairness" in terms of platform access for rivals, see FURMAN REPORT, supra note 14, at 5.
225. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488, 489 (1977)
("[I]njury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent .. . should reflect the
anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the
violation.").
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Firms may acquire monopoly power by establishing an infrastructure

that renders them uniquely suited to serve their customers. Compelling such firms to share the source of their advantage is in some tension with the underlying purpose of antitrust law, since it may lessen
the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in those
economically beneficial facilities. 226
In Trinko, the Court was specifically addressing whether a firm with market
power has a duty to deal with rivals. 227 The principles concerning a dominant
firm's rights and obligations under antitrust law, however, would also seem
to apply to dominant providers of platforms.
Can private label entry ever serve as a basis for a viable theory of harm?
Entry, in of itself, is one of the hallmarks of a competitive market.228 Entry
that is coupled with exclusionary conduct, however, can violate antitrust laws
when the exclusionary conduct has no procompetitive justification and when
the attempt is simply to impair the competitive process. 229 This is the theory
of harm that was advanced in United States v. Microsoft and is a plausible,
viable theory. 230

Some would argue that it is not so much Amazon's entry as it is Amazon's
practice of promoting its own products over those of its rivals, which is akin
to exclusionary conduct. 23 1 Certainly, to the extent that Amazon and other
leading platforms more prominently display their own products, those
products are more likely to be successful-all else being equal-since click
rates are highly influenced by a product's position on the search results
page. 232 In turn, more prominent placement of one product will necessarily

push competing links further down the page, resulting in less traffic being
captured by other firms. 233 Should this be enough to conclude that a platform
entrant has impaired competition and is in violation of the antitrust laws?
The above theory precisely describes the FTC's two-year investigation
into Google's practice of promoting its own "vertical search" results (e.g., a
226. 540 U.S. 398, 407-08 (2004).
227. Id. at 401.
228. E.g., Christopher M. Grengs, Verizon v. Trinko: From Post-Chicago Antitrust to
Resource-Advantage Competition, 2 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 105, 107-08 (2006).
229. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
230. Id. at 58.
231. Khan, supra note 12, at 803.
232. See, e.g., FURMAN REPORT, supra note 14, at 63-64.
233. In some respects, this idea of preferencing in search results is similar to the practice
of grocery stories accepting "slotting fees" (i.e., payments from manufacturers to place products
on the shelf). See FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, SLOTTING ALLOWANCES IN THE RETAIL

GROCERY INDUSTRY 3-4 (2003), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/useslotting-allowances-retail-grocery-industry/slottingallowancerpt0 31114.pdf [https://perma.cc/
GQ62-KVM51.
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map, shopping items with prices, and listing of local restaurants with reviews)
within its "horizontal search" results page (i.e., the standard "blue links"
associated with general search engines). 234 Ultimately, as with all vertical
practices, the case involved weighing the potential exclusionary effects
against potential procompetitive effects. 23 5 In 2013, the FTC closed its

investigation and stated that "quantitative evidence the Commission examined
are largely consistent with the conclusion that Google likely benefited
consumers by prominently displaying its vertical content on its search results
page." 236 Several state attorneys general 237 and Canada also closed their
investigations. 23 8 In 2015, after a multi-year investigation, the EC issued
formal charges against Google, alleging search bias. 23 9 Additionally, in 2016,

the EC further issued a supplementary Statement of Objections. 240 Finally, in
2017, the EC fined Google (2.42 billion for abuse of dominance in Google
Shopping. 241
Whether one agrees with the FTC's or EC's findings, 242 both
investigations (as well as the earlier Microsoft litigation) demonstrate that
agencies and courts have tackled this problem and are able to rule on it. These
investigations and litigation are not easy to conduct. 243 They take time, and

234. Yun, supra note 74, at 311, 314; Salinger & Levinson, supra note 112, at 31-32.
235. See Yun, supra note 74, at 313-14.
236. Statement of the Fed. Trade Comm'n, In re Google Inc., FTC File No. 111-0163, at
2 (Jan. 3, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public statements/statement
-commission-regarding-googles-search-practices/130103brillgooglesearchstmt.pdf [https://per

ma.cc/DZ8V-AZMD].
237. Texas and Ohio closed their respective investigations in 2014. See Zach Miners, Ohio
Google Antitrust Investigation, PCWORLD
(Feb. 9, 2015, 5:05 PM),
https://www.pcworld.com/article/2882072/ohio-closes-google-antitrust-investigation.html
Closes

[https://perma.cc/6TQP-3Y7Q].
238. Press Release, Competition Bureau, Gov't of Canada, Competition Bureau Completes
Extensive Investigation of Google (Apr. 19, 2016), https://www.canada.ca/en/competitionbureau/news/2016/04/competition-bureau-completes-extensive-investigation-of-google.html

[https://perma.cc/9GDD-4NBK].
239. See European Commission Press Release IP/15/4780, Antitrust: Commission Sends
Statement of Objections to Google on Comparison Shopping Service; Opens Separate Formal
Investigation on Android (Apr. 15, 2015).
240. See European Commission Press Release IP/16/2532, Antitrust: Commission Takes
Further Steps in Investigations Alleging Google's Comparison Shopping and AdvertisingRelated Practices Breach EU Rules (July 14, 2016).
241. See Commission Fines Google (2.42 Billion, supra note 31.
242. For an assessment of the EC's decision, see Christian Bergqvist, The Google I
Decision in a Nutshell (Univ. Copenhagen Fac. Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper Series, Paper No. 201855, 2018), https://ssm.com/abstract=3090645 [https://perma.cc/3ZE2-L52L]. For a comparison
with the U.S. case, see Christian Bergqvist & Jonathan Rubin, Google and the Trans-Atlantic
Antitrust Abyss (Univ. Copenhagen Fac. Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper Series, Paper No. 2019-73,
2019), https://ssm.com/abstract=3354766 [https://perma.cc/8UB S-JAGY].
243. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 49 (2001).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol72/iss2/4

38

Yun: Does Antitrust Have Digital Blind Spots?
DIGITAL BLIND SPOTS

20201

343

their findings are not always crystal clear. 244 This undoubtedly causes some
frustration on the part of third parties and outside observers, but it is in no
small part due to the fact that the consequences of such conduct for consumers
and for economic welfare are themselves often unclear or ambiguous. The
question is whether a change in presumption regarding preferencing would

yield better outcomes. While various digital reports advocate for a change in
presumption, they are short of actual evidence that preferencing causes
welfare losses. 245 As various commentaries of the FTC's case against Google
have shown, there are strong procompetitive rationales for the conduct.246
B.

Are Defaults and Pre-InstalledSoftware Exclusionary?

Another practice that academic scholarship and digital reports identify as
a competition problem is that of digital platforms setting defaults. 247
Historically, the most prominent example was Microsoft setting Internet
Explorer as the default web browser on its Windows operating system and not
permitting original equipment manufacturers to remove or replace this

default.248 In Europe, after concluding that Microsoft improperly promoted its
own web browser and media player, a remedy was imposed where Microsoft
was prohibited from setting defaults. 249 Instead, users were presented with an
initial option to select their preferred browser and media players. 250 These
scenarios are the forerunners to today's thinking about defaults.
Borrowing from both the Microsoft remedies and the behavioral

economics literature, digital reports and various scholars argue that defaults
entrench market power and, consequently, are condemnable conduct. 251 They
further argue that consumers should make an "active decision" in selecting
their preferences on digital platforms rather than being presented to them as

244. See STIGLER REPORT, supra note 17, at 31.
245. See CRtMER REPORT, supra note 245, at 66-67.
246. See Salinger & Levinson, supra note 112, at 45.
247. For instance, the ACCC Report recommends the following reform:
Google should provide Australian users of Android devices with the same options
being rolled out to existing Android users in Europe; that is, the ability to choose their
default search engine and default intemet browser from a number of options.
If Google does not introduce similar options for Australian Android users by six
months from the date of the Report, the ACCC will submit to the Government that it
should consider compelling Google to offer this choice.
ACCC REPORT, supra note 16, at 30.
248. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 60-61.
249. See European Commission Press Release IP/09/1941, Antitrust: Commission accepts
Microsoft Commitments to Give Users Browser Choice (Dec. 16, 2009).
250. Id.
251. See, e.g., ACCC REPORT, supra note 16, at 8; Gabriel D. Carroll et al., Optimal
Defaults andActive Decisions, 124 Q.J. ECON. 1639, 1640 (2009).
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defaults. 252 The logic is that this will put competing products on equal footing
by requiring consumers to make the initial choice instead of having a
dominant platform make it for them. 25 3

While this proposed fix is unquestionably about choice, it also affects
convenience. Importantly, users value both convenience and choice. 254
Imposing a regulatory "active decision" for defaults elevates choice over
convenience. In contrast, defaults elevate convenience over active choice
while ultimately preserving choice via the ability to change the defaultassuming, of course, that consumers are able to change the default without
significant costs, which was arguably not the case in Microsoft. There is also
a third possibility to have only one "option" (i.e., an "exclusive" setting that
cannot be adjusted by the user). This third option elevates convenience at the
total expense of choice. From a pure welfare perspective, the question is,
Which of these designs is optimal?
These tradeoffs can be illustrated with a simple model. Suppose that
consumers derive utility from a certain service (a) (e.g., a search engine on a
mobile phone); thus, U = U(a). Further, assume that there are n possible
options for a, and consumers are able to rank those options in order.
Additionally, suppose there are T total consumers in the market. For the
moment, assume there are just two options, n = 2. A certain percentage of

.

consumers prefer option one (a,), which is denoted as a, and a certain
percentage prefers az, which is denoted as 1 - a. The default is set at a1
Assume that the opportunity cost to change the default from a1 to a2 is c.
Under this setup, if the default conforms to a consumer's preferences, then
U = U(ai) and all costs have been minimized as no switching costs are
incurred. If a consumer prefers the alternative to the default, then a cost of c
is incurred to reach U = U(a).
Given the above, aT represents the number of consumers that prefer the
default option (a1 ).

This group incurs no cost to use the product. In

*

contrast, (1 - a)T represents the number of consumers that prefer az. The
total social cost to have them move to their preferred option is (1 - a)T
c. 255 Now, if there are no defaults and all consumers must make an active
decision, then each consumer must incur some inconvenience cost (d) (i.e.,
the need to go through a series of choices before using a device); thus, the
252. The term "active decision" is borrowed from Carroll et al., supra note 251, at 1639.
253. See ACCC REPORT, supra note 16, at 10-11.
254. See Carroll et al., supra note 251, at 1640.
255. Even if consumers do not "move" to their preferred option, we can consider this the
social cost from a mismatch of preferences although, this lack of switching would only occur
if the differential in value between a2 and a1 is less than c. For this purpose, assume that each
consumer's preference for one of the two options is sufficiently strong that it is worth the
switching cost.
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total social cost from not having a default is T * d. It follows that the lack of
default harms total welfare if (1 - a)T * c < T * d or (1 - a) < d/c.
Therefore, as long as the percentage of users who want to change the default
is less than the ratio of the two costs, moving to an active decision regime is
more harmful. For example, assume that twenty percent of users prefer the
non-default option (a); thus, (1 - a) = 0.20. Further assume that the cost of
changing the default is $1 in opportunity cost, and the opportunity cost of
making an active decision is $0.25. In this case, since 0.20 < 0.25/1, having

an active decision regime reduces total welfare. The intuition is that the active
decision cost-even though it is one-fourth the cost of changing the defaultis incurred over the entire user base, while the cost of changing the default is
incurred only by those who do not prefer the default option of a 1 . If the
opportunity cost of an active decision falls to $0.10, then the condition is not
satisfied, and it is better-from a pure welfare perspective-to move to an
active decision regime.
A number of implications emerge from this simple framework. First,
costs matter. If changing the default is relatively costly, then this creates a
great deal of inconvenience and could potentially result in living with a
suboptimal product if the cost to switch is greater than the marginal benefiteven if that marginal benefit is positive. As switching costs decrease,
however, the potential harm to consumers also decreases. Further, the more
consumers generally prefer the default option, the more inefficient it is to
force each of them to explicitly choose that option. Finally, the move to an
active decision regime also depends on the number of active decisions a
consumer must make. It is plausible that the marginal cost of making an active
decision (d) increases with the number of active decisions that must be made
(e.g., a start-up process that requires ten active decisions as opposed to one).

Much of the condemnation of defaults derives from the behavioral
economics literature that indicates consumers can be "nudged" into one
choice or another based on defaults. 256 Depending on the degree of imperfect
information, the idea that consumers can be nudged to one choice over another
might very well be accurate for a set of consumers 257-although it reveals
nothing about whether the nudge is good or bad for welfare. Yet consumers
presumably learn over time if they are satisfied with a particular product. This
is where the level of switching costs becomes relevant. Additionally,

256. See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R.

SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING

DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 6 (2008) ("[A]ny aspect of the choice
architecture that alters people's behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or
significantly changing their economic incentives. To count as a mere nudge, the intervention
must be easy and cheap to avoid. Nudges are not mandates. Putting the fruit at eye level counts
as a nudge. Banning junk food does not.").
257. Id. at 35.
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assuming imperfect information to the degree that consumers are unable even
to make a choice that is in their own best interest 258 regardless of their level
of experience with a product, forcing manufacturers and consumers into using
an active decision regime looks like the exact opposite of what would be
beneficial to consumers.
Suppose it were determined that the cost of switching away from the
default is ten times the cost of an active decision and there is a 50-50 split in
preferences between the two options. According to the prior framework,
moving to an active decision regime could maximize social welfare. Does it
follow that antitrust laws should dictate that, in this case, defaults are
anticompetitive? Again, returning to the extract versus extend paradigm, firms
are under no obligation to maximize static social welfare. 259 Otherwise,

pricing above marginal cost would be an antitrust violation. 260 Firms that set
defaults might very well be nudging consumers to their own products, even if

that product is deemed objectively inferior to an alternative product. If so, is
this an impediment to competition or just another form of a firm's legitimate
extension of its own market power? The difficulty of this question is that it
involves assessments of relative quality, the potential efficiency justifications
for setting defaults a certain way, and the "foreclosure" impact on rivals. For
instance, does it matter that a leading platform had the same defaults when it
first entered? It seems it should. Consequently, questions regarding defaults
and their potential for anticompetitive harm must be made on a case-by-case
basis with a detailed assessment of all relevant questions.
Another point worth emphasizing is that unless the ability to change the
default exists in name only, as was the allegation in Microsoft,26 1 or involves
relatively low to nominal switching costs (even if they may be larger than
making an active decision), the burden should be firmly on the plaintiff to
demonstrate that consumers are systematically being harmed due to the
foreclosure of competitive alternatives-even if most consumers do not in fact
choose to switch to those alternatives.
Further, there are clear instances when defaults are socially optimal, such
as when the relative costs of forcing consumers into a series of active
decisions before using a product are high (i.e., the value of convenience is
greater than the value of choice). 262 Additionally, even if most consumers
prefer a rival's product that is not set as the default (e.g., if consumers
overwhelmingly prefer Google Maps over Apple Maps on Apple's iPhones),
258. See, e.g., Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, LibertarianPaternalism, 93 AM.
ECON. REV. 175, 175 (2003) ("The false assumption is that people always (usually?) make
choices that are in their best interest.").
259. See Carlton & Heyer, supra note 37, at 286.
260. See id at 287-88.
261. United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 84-85 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
262. See, e.g., Carroll et al., supra note 251, at 1654-55.
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firms are generally not under an obligation to promote a rival's product. 263
While this is-strictly speaking-a legal point, it is also an economic one: it
is highly likely that dynamic incentives are negatively affected by the
promotion of a rival's product. 264
Finally, defaults are pervasive in virtually every platform and designirrespective of the level of antitrust market power. 265 In contrast, active
decision prompts are almost non-existent.266 As Professor Richard Thaler has
pointed out, "[d]efaults are ubiquitous and powerful. They are also
unavoidable in the sense that for any node of a choice architecture system,
there must be an associated rule that determines what happens to the decision
maker if she does nothing." 267 Further, defaults allow a platform to better
control the consumer experience by allowing the firm to optimize the "setup"
and creating some basic uniformity while, at the same time, ultimately
providing users an ability to tailor the experience to a particular preference. 268
For these reasons, sweeping bans on defaults that are employed by market
leading platforms could conceivably reduce welfare. This reduction would
arguably interfere with the normative purpose of antitrust laws. Defaults can
have a strong efficiency justification, and the likelihood of an efficiency does
not go away just because the firm involved happens also to be a platform with
a lot of market power. Of course, if the conduct is coupled with other
considerations, such as imposing exclusivity, tying, and other vertical
controls, then the analysis should properly be expanded to incorporate these
considerations. 269

263. See Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. L. Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 411
(2004).
264. See, e.g., Thomas W. Hazlett & Anil Caliskan, Natural Experiments in U.S.
BroadbandRegulation 15 (Geo. Mason Univ. L. & Econ. Res. Paper Series, PaperNo. 04, 2008)
("Cable modem services held nearly a two-to-one market share advantage when DSL carriers
were most heavily obligated to provide 'open access' to competing ISPs. Once the FCC
eliminated a key provision of that access regime . . DSL subscribership increased dramatically.
By year-end 2006, DSL subscribership was 65% higher - more than 9 million households - than
it would have been under the linear trend established under 'open access' regulation.").
265. See Richard H. Thaler et al., Choice Architecture, in THE BEHAVIORAL
FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY 428 (2014).

266. See ACCC REPORT, supra note 16, at 10-11.
267. Thaler et al., supra note 265, at 430.
268. See id
269. For instance, in Microsoft, Microsoft argued that other operating systems for
example, IBM's OS/2 also included a browser. The difference was that the plaintiff argued
and the district court found that Microsoft's browser was "tied" and not simply included as the
default. See United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 84 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
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AMERICANEXPRESS DECISION

Given the discussion from the prior two parts, there is clearly an
overwhelming belief from a growing movement of academics, foreign
competition authorities, and politicians that antitrust jurisprudenceparticularly as it applies to the digital sector-needs serious reform. Again,
this belief is built on a number of pillars. The first pillar, which was addressed
in Part II above, is that digital platforms have unique characteristics,
foundationally based on their network effects. The second pillar, which was
addressed in Part III, is that self-preferencing and defaults are welfarereducing and anticompetitive. A third pillar is that the U.S. legal system is
currently incapable of effectively analyzing and ruling on complex cases
involving digital platforms. 270
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Ohio v. American Express

(Amex) is presented by critics as an alleged inability of current antitrust
jurisprudence to properly assess the intricacies of network effects and
platform conduct. 271 Consequently, critics argue that antitrust law needs either
to develop stronger anticompetitive presumptions regarding market power

and specific practices or to move beyond antitrust law to regulatory
solutions. 272 This final part assesses whether the Court in Amex understood
the role of network effects and whether it properly applied an economic
analysis and the rule of reason standard to the platform's challenged conduct.
American Express uses an antisteering provision in its agreement with

merchants. When an American Express cardholder is about to purchase an
Omega watch from a merchant, under its agreement with American Express,
that merchant is prohibited from "steering" the cardholder to an alternate
credit card such as Discover-although, the merchant can steer consumers to
alternate payment methods such as cash, checks, or debit cards. 273 A
merchant, for instance, would not be able to offer a one percent discount on
the watch's purchase price in exchange for the cardholder using a Discover
270. STIGLER REPORT, supra note 17, at 85.
271. See, e.g., Tim Wu, The American Express Opinion, the Rule of Reason, and Tech
Platforms, 7 J. ANTITRUST ENF'T 117, 118 (2019); Michael L. Katz, Platform Economics and
Antitrust Enforcement: A Little Knowledge Is a Dangerous Thing, 28 J. ECON. & MGMT.

STRATEGY 138, 138 (2019); Dennis W. Carlton, The Anticompetitive Effects of VerticalMostFavored-Nation Restraints and the Error of Amex, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 93, 103;

STIGLER REPORT, supra note 17, at 91.
272. See, e.g., CRtMER REPORT, supra note 15, at 51-52.
273. The merchant can, however, steer consumers to alternate payment methods, such as
cash, checks, or debit cards. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co. (Amex), 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2283 (2018).
Visa and MasterCard had similar antisteering provisions; however, they voluntarily revoked
their provisions after being sued by the DOJ. See Chad Bray, Visa, MasterCardWin Approval
ofSettlement in Anti-Steering' Case, WALL ST. J. (July 20, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles
/SB10001424053111904233404576458081673213422 [https://perma.cc/G32H-NE6J].
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card instead. 27 4 The reason a merchant has this incentive is that the swipe
fee-the percentage of the retail price that the merchant must pay the credit
card company-is higher for American Express (e.g., 6%) than it is for
Discover (e.g., 3%).275 By switching the cardholder to Discover, both the
merchant and cardholder could end up keeping more money. Steering sounds
like a great deal. Both the merchant and the cardholder are made better offat least in the short term. Consequently, is the antisteering provision an
anticompetitive attempt to improperly "restrain trade" and harm consumer

welfare through a contract?
In a 5-4 vote, the Court ruled that American Express did not violate § 1
of the Sherman Act with its antisteering provision. 276 Writing for the majority,
Justice Thomas concluded that the policy, which has been in place since the
1950s, does not "unreasonably restrain trade." 277 The majority explained that
the antisteering provision fosters the preservation of the American Express
network, which is a differentiated product that caters to high-valued
consumers with its premium customer service, cardholder benefits, and
generous member rewards. 278 The goal of these features is to attract and retain
these high-valued cardholders and to encourage their frequent use of the card.
These high-valued cardholders, in turn, attract merchants to become part of
the American Express network. 279

American Express argued that when merchants steer cardholders away,
they free ride on the company's cardholder network. 280 The idea was that
American Express spends a considerable amount of resources developing a
desirable network of cardholders who gain benefits from using their cards. 28 1
Not surprisingly, these cardholders are attracted to merchants that accept the
American Express card. Yet if the merchant switches cardholders at the point
of sale, American Express is not able to benefit from driving greater traffic to

274. See Amex, 138 S. Ct. at 2283.
275. See id at 2282-83.
276. Id. at 2290. The antisteering provision is a form of a vertical restraint, which is an
agreement between two firms on the same vertical supply chain. Id. at 2284. These restraints fall
under a rule of reason analysis where potential anticompetitive harms are weighed against
potential procompetitive benefits. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. 551
U.S. 877, 881-82 (2007); Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).
277. See Amex, 138 S. Ct. at 2290.
278. See id. at 2282 ("In sum, Amex's business model has stimulated competitive
innovations in the credit-card market, increasing the volume of transactions and improving the
quality of the services.").
279. Id. ("Merchants place a higher value on these cardholders, and Amex uses this
advantage to recruit merchants.").
280. See Brief for Respondents at 1, Amex, 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018) (No. 16-1454).
281. See id. Unlike Visa and MasterCard, who earn half of their revenues from cardholder
interest payments, American Express earns the bulk of its revenue from swipe fees. Id.
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the merchant. 28 2 While this practice of "steering" creates a potential short-run
gain to merchants and cardholders, they are-in effect-imposing a negative
externality on other merchants and cardholders. 283 Steering reduces the
viability of the American Express network and, in particular, the ability of
American Express to offer a premium product, which is what attracted
cardholders to the network in the first place. 284 Further, merchants are free to
not be a part of the American Express network if they do not agree with the
antisteering term. 28 5

The fact that American Express holds only a 26% share in the credit card
market suggests that its alleged significant market power over merchants is
questionable 286-not to mention that there are other forms of payment that are
not affected by the policy, including cash, checks, and debit cards. 287 To put
this value into context, according to a report from members of the Federal
Reserve System's Cash Product Office, only 27% of consumers chose credit
cards as their primary payment preference. 288 Consequently, doing a back-ofthe-envelope calculation, only 7% of consumers prefer to use American
Express as their primary payment method. It seems highly implausible that a
policy that affects 7% of consumers could cause anticompetitive harm to
merchants-given consumers have the ex ante choice to accept or reject the
terms to join the network.

282. See id at 2283.
283. See id. at 2289 (suggesting that antisteering "agreements actually stem negative
externalities in the credit-card market and promote interbrand competition").
284. This description of the free-riding problem is focused on free-riding on the brand and
not on other forms of potential free-riding described by Justice Breyer in his dissent in Amex.
Id. at 2304 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Nor is free-riding used here as it is in Carlton, supra note
271, at 104. Brand free-riding is described in the Second Circuit's opinion. See United States v.
Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d. 179, 204 (2d Cir. 2016).
285. SeeAmex, 138 S. Ct. at 2277-78 (discussing that a company (e.g., American Express)
needs both cardholders and merchants using its network).
286. See id. at 2282. This is not to suggest that American Express does not have some
degree of economic market power based on a differentiated product. This is presumably what
allows American Express to charge a higher swipe fee. Yet this is different from establishing
antitrust market power, which is based more on controlling a significant and relevant area of
commerce. See Benjamin Klein, Market Power in Antitrust: Economic Analysis After Kodak, 3
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 43, 73 (1993) ("Therefore, although most firms have some market power
in the strict economic sense, most firms do not have market power in the sense relevant to
antitrust because 'when courts find a firm has market power, they must mean a substantial
amount of market power."').
287. If merchants are able to switch customers to cash or credit, does this undermine
American Express's free-riding argument? It does to a degree; although steering to other credit
cards presumably represents the more significant impact on free-riding.
288. See WENDY MATHENY ET AL., CASH PROD. OFF. FED. RSRV. SYS., THE STATE OF
CASH 9 (2016), https://www.frbsforg/cash/files/FedNotes-The-State-of-Cash-PreliminaryFindings-2015-Diary -of-Consumer-Payment-Choice.pdf [https://perma.cc/X42F-HQ8U].
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Ultimately, although Amex was most directly concerned with American
Express's antisteering provision, a broader legal issue concerned the burden
that a plaintiff faces in a rule of reason case involving a two-sided platform. 289
The rule of reason analysis follows a three-step framework, where the
standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence with no presumption of
legality or illegality. 290 Under step one, the plaintiff has a prima facie burden

of producing evidence to show anticompetitive harm. 29 1 If anticompetitive
harm is demonstrated, the burden of production shifts to the defendant under
step two, during which the defendant must offer evidence of procompetitive
efficiencies. 292 If such efficiencies are identified, step three shifts the burden
of production back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the procompetitive
efficiencies either could be achieved through less restrictive alternatives or are
significantly smaller than the demonstrated harms. 293
In cases where the defendant operates a platform, the debate over how to
apply the rule of reason boils down to when and where the defendant should
properly account for potentially offsetting the efficiency effects that occur "on
the other side" of the market. 294 Here, American Express's practice plausibly
benefited its cardholders, even though merchants may have paid higher fees
as a consequence. Specifically, is the step one prima facie burden-showing
that the practice has generated anticompetitive effects-met by demonstrating
welfare loss to just one side of a multi-sided platform (e.g., merchants)? Or
does this step require a showing of net harm to competition after accounting
for the benefits to cardholders? The question of which party properly faces
the burden of showing that the benefits exceed the harms-and where in the
rule of reason process this should take place-is critical.
The district court ruled that the plaintiffs in Amex met their prima facie
burden by presenting sufficient evidence that merchants were paying a higher
price due to higher swipe fees (compared to a counterfactual without the
antisteering provision). 295 The Second Circuit reversed and found that the
district court improperly, and too narrowly, focused on the harm to merchants
when, for the plaintiffs to meet their prima facie burden, the court needed to
289. See Amex, 138 S. Ct. at 2285-87 (discussing two-sided platforms).
290. Id. at 2284.
291. Id.; see Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)
("The injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive
acts made possible by the violation.").
292. Amex, 138 S. Ct. at 2284.
293. Id. Implicitly, there is a "fourth step" where the court balances both the
anticompetitive and procompetitive effects. See Michael A. Carrier, The Four-Step Rule of
Reason, ANTITRUST, Spring 2019, at 50, 51.
294. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Platforms and the Rule of Reason: The American Express
Case, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 35, 71-75.
295. United States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 151-52 (E.D.N.Y. 2015),
rev'd, 838 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2016), aff'd sub nom. Amex, 138 S. Ct. at 2274.
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consider the welfare of both merchants and cardholders (i.e., both sides of a
two-sided platform). 296 The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit's
decision and found:
The plaintiffs have not carried their burden to prove anticompetitive
effects in the relevant market. The plaintiffs stake their entire case on
proving that American Express' agreements increase merchant fees.
We find this argument unpersuasive. . . . Evidence of a price increase

on one side of a two-sided transaction platform cannot by itself
demonstrate an anticompetitive exercise of market power. 297
Much has been written about Amex, and there is no shortage of vocal
critics and defenders. 298 Critics assert that the Court did not understand
network effects and platform economics and, more importantly, that the Court
bungled the implementation of these economic concepts into a rule of reason
framework, including who should bear the burden of showing the welfare
benefits and harms. 299 However, to the contrary, the Court properly and
reasonably fit the features of platform markets into a conceptually coherent
methodology that aligns the rule of reason analysis with current economic
learning.

Some scholars argue that platform markets, such as credit card networks,
should be defined as two separate, relevant product markets: one for
cardholders and one for merchants. 300 Further, while acknowledging the need
to consider the interrelationship between the two sides, these scholars contend
that since these are two separate markets, the prima facie burden is satisfied
when anticompetitive harm is found on only one of these sides. 301
Splitting a platform into two separate markets for the purpose of antitrust
analysis, however, runs afoul of a simple reality: no platform maximizes profit
over just one side. 302 Rather, profit maximization is determined through ajoint

&

296. Amex, 838 F.3d at 206-07.
297. Amex, 138 S. Ct. at 2287.
298. For criticisms of the decision, see supra note 271 and accompanying text. See also
Hovenkamp, supra note 294, at 46-56. For defenders of the decision, see DAVID S. EVANS
RICHARD

SCHMALENSEE,

ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF PLATFORM MARKETS: WHY THE SUPREME

COURT GOT IT RIGHT IN AMERICAN EXPRESS 64 (2019); Joshua D. Wright & John M. Yun,
Burdens and Balancing in Multisided Markets: The First Principles Approach of Ohio v.
American Express, 54 REV. INDUS. ORG. 717 (2019).
299. See, e.g., Carlton, supra note 271, at 102-106.
300. See Michael Katz & Jonathan Sallet, MultisidedPlatforms andAntitrustEnforcement,
127 YALE L.J. 2142, 2144-45 (2018).
301. See id at 2173-74.
302. One could argue that a firm producing complementary goods also does not maximize
profit over just one good (e.g., a firm that manufacturers both printers and ink). Yet this
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consideration of both sides. A platform, by its very nature, balances the
interests of multiple sides and structures its price and non-price terms to
achieve this balance. Further, as the Court emphasized, credit card networks
are "transaction platforms," 303 which are platforms where both sides share a
common level of output. This also illustrates that artificially bifurcating the
two sides into separate competitive effects analyses does not align with how
firms actually make decisions. Antitrust law must start from these economic
realities and fit the administration of the rule of reason analysis around them.
Conceptually, perhaps one of the strongest criticisms of the Court's
approach is that it effectively eliminates step two of the rule of reason
analysis-where the defendant bears the burden of justifying its conduct as
procompetitive. 304 Instead, that burden is shifted to the plaintiff in step one
during which, in order to meet its prima facie burden, the plaintiff must show
that the net effect is negative. 305 This is an important criticism. Ultimately, the
Court had to weigh two possible regimes. The first regime involves a
framework where the prima facie burden is met simply with a price increase
on one side. 306 The second regime, which was adopted by the Court, involves
a framework where the plaintiff's burden must not only include a one-sided
price increase but also include "evidence of anticompetitive effects .

.

. such

as reduced output, increased prices, or decreased quality." 307 In other words,
is a one-sided price increase actually and reliably evidence of anticompetitive
harm? The integrated nature of the two sides does not support this proposition;

consequently, the second regime better aligns with the economic realities of
platforms. Importantly, Professors David Evans and Richard Schmalensee
assert the following:
This is not a matter of burden-shifting. There is simply no way to
know, especially in the case of a platform that provides a service that
customers on each side consume jointly, whether a practice is
anticompetitive without at least considering both types of customers
and the overall competition among platforms. That analysis must,

recognition proves the point. One cannot understand the pricing of printers without
understanding the demand for ink and vice versa. The difference is that printers and ink are
complementary products used by the same group of consumers. Thus, a given consumer will
internalize the full benefits and costs of pricing decisions from a firm over both printers and ink
products. This is not the case for a platform which is balancing the interests of two or more
separate groups.
303. Amex, 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2280 (2018); see also Lapo Filistrucchi, Two-Sided vs.
Complementary Products, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Sept. 2018, at 2, 4.
304. See Carlton, supra note 271, at 102.
305. See id
306. See Amex, 138 S. Ct. at 2278.
307. Id. at 2284.
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therefore, happen at the first stage of the rule of reason to assess
whether the conduct is anticompetitive or not. 308

Additionally, under a framework where the prima facie burden is met
simply with a price increase on one side, this "distorts the assignment of
burdens in the form of placing a thumb on the scale for plaintiffs in platform
cases by redefining 'competitive harm' to mean any harm to any group of

consumers." 309 The reality is that such an alternate framework would result in
no real ability of the defendant to offer procompetitive justifications in step
two. Evans and Schmalensee, for example, observe:
First, it isn't clear that the court could consider the other side-specific
market in the second stage of the rule of reason inquiry. The trial court
judge noted that pro-competitive benefits on the consumer side, in "a
separate, though intertwined antitrust market," could not be used to offset
anti-competitive effects on the merchant side. Second, after finding that a
practice is anti-competitive in the first stage, courts seldom give much
weight to pro-competitive benefits in the second stage. 310
Further, it is not entirely clear that the burden is actually higher for
plaintiffs in step one-particularly for transaction platforms. For instance,
output, which is shared by both sides of a transaction platform, could serve as
a reliable guide to welfare effects. This focus on output is something that
conforms with both the law and economics of assessing markets and market
power. 3 11

308. EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 298, at 40.

309. Wright & Yun, supra note 298, at 727.
310. EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 298, at 27. Note that the argument that benefits
from "a separate, though intertwined antitrust market" could not offset harm in the merchant
market is a legal, not economic, argument.
311. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 237
(1993) ("Where, as here, output is expanding at the same time prices are increasing, rising prices
are equally consistent with growing product demand."); Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v.
PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. at 895-96 (holding that it is a mistake to rely on "pricing effects absent a
further showing of anticompetitive conduct" and observing that "prices can be increased in the
course of promoting procompetitive effects"). For more on the importance of output effects, see
Thomas A. Lambert, A Decision-Theoretic Rule of Reason for Minimum Resale Price
Maintenance, 55 ANTITRUST BULL. 167, 169 (2010); Wright & Yun, supra note 298, at 73234. It is worth noting that Professor Michael Katz has shown scenarios where output expansion
does not necessarily improve welfare. See Katz, supra note 271, at 146-47. Yet, as a general
proposition, output expansion is a highly reliable metric for assessing improvements in
consumer welfare. See, e.g., 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST

LAW ¶ 501, at 109 (4th ed. 2017) ("Market power is the ability to raise price profitably by
restricting output.").
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In sum, the interrelationship between the various sides of a platform is
critical. 312 Specifically, for a platform like American Express, changes in
cardholders' terms have a material impact on the number of transactions that
merchants will enjoy. These feedback effects between the two sides are central
to assessing conduct on the platform. The rule of reason framework
established by the Court in Amex properly assessed and incorporated the
economic literature on platforms into an administrable, coherent approach by
shifting the burden of production. Rather than increasing the burden on
plaintiffs, it requires plaintiffs to do a complete analysis of the effects of a
given conduct on the platform instead of on an unnatural and narrowly focused
segment of an integrated market.313
V.

CONCLUSION

Presently, antitrust law is among its most unprecedented times where
there is a chorus-albeit lacking complete consonance-from various
stakeholders seeking significant antitrust reforms. This chorus is comprised
of myriad groups of academics, politicians from across the political divide,
and various digital reports. 314
Ultimately, these calls for reform too often lack completeness and are too
broad and general to form a reliable guide for agencies, courts, and
legislatures. This is not to say questions regarding large platforms are

completely and categorically settled. Network effects are certainly a key
consideration in assessing certain digital markets, but it is important to
understand precisely how and to what extent they are affecting these markets.
Rather than being a presumptive source of market failure, network effects are
more properly assessed as a market feature that must be accounted for in order
to understand firm conduct. Similarly, there is a paucity of evidence
312. See, e.g., David S. Evans, Basic Principlesfor the Design of Antitrust Analysis for
Multisided Platforms, 7 J. ANTITRUST ENF'T 319, 326 (2019) ("What makes two-sided
platforms different is that, not only are there two distinct types of customers, but the demand by
those customers are interdependent, as are the prices they are charged, and their welfare is
linked.").
313. There is a question regarding whether an integrated competitive effects analysis
necessarily involves defining an integrated relevant product market or whether an integrated
effects analysis can still be performed with separate relevant product markets. While the logic
follows most naturally with an integrated market, there is still an argument that an integrated
effects analysis is still consistent with separate markets. See Wright & Yun, supra note 298, at
726-29.
314. This involvement of stakeholders outside of academia perhaps distinguishes the
current antitrust reform movement from the reforms advanced in the 1970s, which was a "double
helix" of influence and contributions from both the Chicago and Harvard Schools. See William
E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern US. Competition Law for Dominant Firm
Conduct: The Chicago/HarvardDouble Helix, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 13-14.
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demonstrating that the conduct of digital platforms is actually reducing
welfare and harming consumers. Finally, a close reading of the Court's Amex
decision reveals an opinion that carefully treads the economic literature on
platforms and implements that learning into a coherent rule of reason
framework.

The most radical claim being made today is perhaps the most
controversial one: that current antitrust law and enforcement actually are
sufficient to properly assess and adjudicate conduct involving digital
platforms. Antitrust law has always had an evolutionary character that
recognizes the need to adjust to new learnings.3 15 This does not mean that the
law is necessarily efficient or always moving in the right direction. Still, as
long as antitrust law is tied to measures of economic efficiency and welfare
and so long as it continues to carefully examine actual evidence rather than
fall victim to unfounded presumptions, it provides a more reliable body of law
for fostering innovation and economic progress than do the alternatives being
proposed by its critics.

315. See, e.g., Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933) ("As
a charter of freedom, the [Sherman A]ct has a generality and adaptability comparable to that
found to be desirable in constitutional provisions."). In overturning per se condemnation of
maximum resale price maintenance, Justice O'Connor wrote that "the general presumption that
legislative changes should be left to Congress has less force with respect to the Sherman Act in
light of the accepted view that Congress 'expected the courts to give shape to the statute's broad
mandate by drawing on common-law tradition."' State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20-21
(1997) (quoting Nat'l Soc'y of Pro. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978)); see also
D. Bruce Johnsen, Wealth is Value, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 263, 286 (1986) ("The notion that
adjudication is an iterative process designed to minimize the judiciary's measurement costs by
requiring only marginal decisions is therefore supported in the law of antitrust.").
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